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INTRODUCTION
In this issue the Denver Law Center Journal introduces a
number of new policies in conjunction with its annual One Year
Review of Colorado Law. This year the review has been written
entirely by students. Cases appearing in the review have been
selected on the basis of legal significance, in either the development
or the clarification of a point of law. An occasional case has been
included because of its particular factual interest.
Concomitant with the reduction in the number of cases treated,
an attempt has been made to effect a somewhat more critical
analysis of each case, where possible, rather than a mere exposition
of the action of the supreme court. Furthermore, a few cases of
importance have been omitted from the review in favor of a more
elaborate treatment in subsequent issues in the form of case comments or case notes.
The editors are optimistic in their opinion that this new format
will prove to be more useful to members of the bar.

ONE YEAR REVIEW OF AGENCY, PARTNERSHIPS,
CORPORATIONS, AND MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS
BY JACK MCCONNELL*
I.

MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS

Surprisingly enough, Bunzell v. City of Golden' presented the
Supreme Court of Colorado with its first opportunity to consider
the powers of a city to revoke a 3.2% retail beer license. The facts
motivating the attempted revocation are found only in Justice
McWilliams' dissenting opinion:
[There was satisfactory evidence] that malt beverage
was served to minors (under 18 years); that hard liquor
(rum) was consumed on the premises; that beer over the
content of 3.2 was consumed on the premises. (Hienbrau);
that the officers were called many times to answer disturbance charges; that loud noises were permitted to occur; that
indecent acts were observed; that insults were used and a
female accosted.
One observer noted the carrying away of a teen-ager
in an intoxicated condition. Drag racing and other acts
which make the exercising of the police power of the
municipality mandatory [were also observed]2
Senior Student, University of Denver
1 378 P.2d 208 (Colo. 1963).
2 Id. at 210-211.
*

College of Low.
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The trial court upheld the city council's revocation of the
license, and the defendants brought error to the supreme court.
The city argued to the supreme court that the city's power to grant
a license implied the power to revoke it for cause. This argument
was rejected. In reversing the lower court's decision, the supreme
court held that C.R.S. '53 § 75-1-14 requires that the revocation
of a 3.2% beer license "cannot be effected in the absence of a conviction of an offense described as a misdemeanor ' 3 by that article.
The court emphasized these words of the section: "[U] pon such
conviction any license granted and issued under the provisions
of this article to said person so convicted may be revoked. . . ."I
While the evidence seemed to show that beverages containing
over 3.2% alcohol were consumed on the premises, it was not shown
that this was done with the defendants' permission. Justice Moore's
majority opinion points out that "there are no findings that
Bunzell sold, possessed, or 'permitted the consumption on the
premises' of any beverages containing alcohol in excess of three and
two-tenths per cent" 5 as prohibited by C.R.S. '53 § 75-1-12. This
section provides that any such violation "shall immediately cause
• . . cancellation of the license granted under this article." Justice
Moore said that this section "is not involved in the instant case
and this opinion is not to be construed as applicable to any situation
which might arise under said section."6
Justice McWilliams' dissent adopts the city's argument that the
power to issue the license carried with it the power to revoke, and
that this power was in addition to the power to revoke under
section 12 and 14. 7 No authority for this conclusion is cited.
It is difficult to agree with the dissent in the face of the statutory command of section 14. Its language clearly requires a conviction before a license can be revoked. Moreover, requiring a conviction for violation of the statute before revocation of the license
is a desirable safeguard to prevent arbitrary and capricious action
by municipalities; this procedure is reasonable and will not unduly
burden any municipality in the supervision of its 3.2% beer
licensees.
In Bingham v. Bach,8 certain policemen employed by the City
and County of Denver attempted unsuccessfully to enjoin the
Civil Service Commission of the City and County of Denver from
certifying any promotion list containing preference for employees
with service-connected disability of less than ten per cent. The
plaintiffs contended that Colo. Const. art. XII, section 14, does not
define "disability"; therefore, reference should be made
to applicable presidential proclamations under which authority the department of war, navy department and the
United States veterans administration were or are empowered to so certify service-connected disabilities. And
that under said statutes and proclamations only disability
ratings of at least ten per cent are authorized. 9
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

Id. at 209.
Ibid.
Id. at 210.
Ibid.
Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 75-1-12, 14 (1953).
377 P.2d 741 (Colo. 1963).
Id. at 743.
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Section 14 of article XII of the state constitution provides that
five points shall be added to the grades of candidates honorably
discharged from the armed forces; and that an additional five
points shall be added if such candidate also "incurred disability
in the line of duty while so serving" and was so discharged.
The trial court's refusal to grant the injunction was upheld.
Justice Moore said, "The veterans preference provision of the
constitution contains no language limiting its application to a
percentage of disability, and so may not reasonably be interpreted
as contended for by plaintiffs."'10
II.

CORPORATIONS

There were few Colorado decisions in 1963 concerning corporate law. The only significant case from the standpoint of the
law involved was Goeddel v. Aircraft Finance, Inc.," which interpreted portions of the Uniform Stock Transfer Act12 for the
first time.
In August, 1951, plaintiff Goeddel and one Vest (now deceased)
entered into an agreement for sale to the plaintiff of certain
corporate stock. The plaintiff gave Vest a check and a note for the
balance. The note was to be paid out of the profits of the company.
No attempt was made to transfer title by way of separate written
instrument or by the delivery of the stock. A disagreement arose
between the two in November or December of the same year, and
Vest gave the plaintiff a check which he endorsed as payment in
full for all the plaintiff's interest in the company. The plaintiff
testified that within the next eight to ten months Vest attempted
to "settle" but that the plaintiff refused. Just why there was anything left to "settle" when plaintiff seemingly had been paid in
full for his interest was not discussed in the opinion. The plaintiff
further testified that he decided he would do nothing about the
matter as long as Vest was alive.
Vest died on September 14, 1960. On December 20 of that year,
the plaintiff demanded to examine the books of the corporation but
was refused. This action to establish the plaintiff's ownership of the
stock was filed on January 23, 1961. This was more than eight years
subsequent to the last dealings between the plaintiff and Vest.
The trial court's dismissal of the action was affirmed by the
supreme court. Justice Sutton said that under sections nine and ten
of the Uniform Stock Transfer Act, 1 the plaintiff was neither a
stockholder in the corporation at the time the action was brought
nor could he compel the corporation to make him a stockholder.
10 id. at 745.
11 382 P.2d 812 (Colo. 1963).
12 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 31-9-1 to 22 (1953).
13 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 31-9-9 (1953): "The delivery of a certificate by the person appearing by
the certificate to be the owner thereof without the indorsement requisite for the transfer of the
certificate and the shares represented thereby, but with intent to transfer such certificates or shares,
shall impose an obligation, in the absence of an agreement to the contrary, upon the person so
delivering, to complete the transfer by making the necessary indorsement. The transfer shall take
effect as of the time when the indorsement is actually made. This obligation may be specifically
enforced."
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 31-9-10 (1953): "An attempted transfer of title to a certificate or to the shares
represented thereby without delivery of the certificate shall have the effect of a promise to
transfer and the obligation, if any, imposed by such promise shall be determined by the law
governing the formation and performance of contracts."
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The court followed a recent Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals decision 14 quoting the following:
When these statutes [sections nine and ten] are considered
together, it is clear that in Colorado legal title to shares of
stock issued by a corporation organized under the law of
that state can be effectively transferred in only one or the
other of two methods. One method is by delivery of the certificate with an endorsement thereon in blank or to a specified person, signed by the person appearing in the certificate to be the owner thereof. The other is by delivery of the
certificate and a separate document containing a written
assignment or a power of attorney to sell, assign, or transfer
the same, signed by the person appearing in the certificate
to be the owner of the stock. These methods are exclusive,
and any attempt to transfer stack without delivery of the
certificate does not have the effect of passing title but merely constitutes a promise to transfer.15
Since the plaintiff had no title to the stock at the time the
action was brought, the court said he had "at best" a claim for relief
against Vest's executors to complete transfer of the stock to him.
But this claim was barred by the six year statute of limitations
applicable to actions founded on contract. 16
Colorado Ass'n of Accountants v. Colorado Society of Certified
Public Accountants 7 was of factual interest. Reversing the trial
court, the supreme court held that the defendants' use of the name
"Public Accountants Society of Colorado" was not confusingly similar to the name "Colorado Society of Certified Public Accountants."
The defendants had not violated an injunction restraining the defendants from doing business under the name "Colorado Society of
Public Accountants" or another term so similar as to mislead or
deceive the public or as to lead to uncertainty or confusion.
III.

AGENCY

In contrast to the profusion of agency cases in recent years,
only one 1963 decision concerned agency law.
Public Employees' Retirement Ass'n v. Johnson's was an action
by a member of the state's employees' retirement association to
recover money paid by him into the Association. The plaintiff Johnson had executed a document in favor of the credit union from
which he obtained a loan. The document read:
So long as this note remains unpaid, I hereby appoint
.. . the Colorado State Employees Credit Union to be my
attorney-in-fact and in case I should cease to be employed
by the State of Colorado to demand and receive any moneys
or credits payable to me from the State of Colorado, or from
any bank, employees retirement fund, or other depository
19

The plaintiff resigned from state employment. On the day of
14
15
16
17
18
19

Brennan v. W. A. Wills, Ltd., 263 F.2d 1 (10th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 360 U.S. 902 (1959).
382 P.2d at 814. (Emphasis added by the court.)
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 87-1-11(4) (1953).
384 P.2d 94 (Colo. 1963).
385 P.2d 415 (Colo. 1963).
Id. at 416. (Emphasis added by the court.)
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resignation, he made a formal demand on the defendant Association
for refund of the money deposited to his credit. On the same day the
Credit Union filed the "power of attorney" document with the defendant. A week later, the plaintiff revoked this power and two days
later demanded his funds from the defendant again. On the same
day the Association paid over the funds to the Credit Union which
credited them to the plaintiff's loan account. On subsequent demand
for his funds, and another refusal by the defendant, this action was
instituted.
The trial court held that the document signed by plaintiff was
an equitable assignment coupled with an interest and void by the
terms of the statute governing public employees' retirement systems. This statute in part provides:
Funds not subject to process.-None of the moneys, annuities or other benefits mentioned in this article shall be
assignable either in law or equity or subject to execution,
levy, attachment, garnishment or other legal
process, and
2
shall be exempt from any state income tax. '1
The supreme court sustained the judgment for the plaintiff but
held that the reasoning of the trial court's decision was erroneous.
Justice Day said that the document did not assign or transfer any
interest to the Credit Union, and therefore the appointment was
revocable. Since the defendant Association received both the demand by the power of attorney and the plaintiff's demand before
any money had been paid out, it made no difference which demand
was received first. The plaintiff's demand for the entire amount to
be paid directly to him superseded the power of attorney and put
the Association on notice of the revocation of the power. The plaintiff was therefore entitled to receive his money from the Association.
In a specially concurring opinion, Justice Hall condemned the
obvious effort of the parties to avoid prohibitions of section 20:
"Inescapably, Johnson, the Credit Union and the Association,
through their devious means, succeeded in accomplishing that which
the legislature sought to prevent ....
[These] procedures . . . are
approved" by the majority.2 ' Justice Hall would have found, as the
trial court did, that there was an equitable assignment of funds
which is declared void by the statute.
This position is more convincing than that of the majority. As
Justice Hall points out, the majority's opinion clears the way for
the Credit Union and the Public Employees' Retirement Association
to circumvent the clear legislative intent of section twenty. By simply limiting the loan to the amount which the borrowers have in
their retirement fund, the Credit Union has a 100% security on its
loans. The only stumbling block is that the borrower may revoke
the power of attorney as Johnson did.
IV.

PARTNERSHIPS

Realty Dev. Co. v. Feit22 apparently broadened the criteria for
establishing a joint venture in Colorado. The plaintiff sued the
20 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 111-1-20 (1953).
21 385 P.2d at 418.
22 387 P.2d 898 (Colo. 1963).
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Gamble Land and Development Company and the Realty Development Company for salary and commission due for services rendered.
It was not disputed that Gamble had hired the plaintiff and had
defaulted in its obligation to pay him. The plaintiff, however, sought
to join the Realty Development Company as party defendant on the
theory of a joint venture. Gamble and Realty had a written agreement which provided that Gamble was to pay Realty 500 dollars for
each home sold in return for financial assistance. There was no
agreement to share losses, and the payment was not contingent upon
Gamble's making a profit.
The lower court found that a joint venture existed and rendered
judgment against both defendants. The supreme court reversed the
judgment of the trial court and, quoting from an Oklahoma decision ,23 adopted the following requirements as necessary for the
establishment of a joint venture:
(1) There must be joint interest in the property by the
parties sought to be held as partners; (2) there must be
agreements, express or implied, to share in the profits -and
losses of the venture; and (3) there must be actions and
conduct showing co-operation
in the project. None of these
24
elements alone is sufficient.
The court then held that since there was no agreement between the
defendants to share in profits and losses, no joint venture existed.
The necessity of an agreement to share in profits and losses had
been previously emphasized in Fedderson v. Goode.2 5 In Fedderson
the court approved the following language from another Oklahoma
case, Commercial Lumber Co. v. Nelson: 26 "The chief characteristic
27
of a joint adventure is a joint and not a several profit.
The possibility of mutual profit or loss was also used as the
test of a joint venture in Austin v. Stephen.28 Therein,
the court
29
relied upon the following quotation from Corpus Juris:
When the agreement provides that both . . . the parties
thereto shall contribute money to be used in the purchase
of lands . . to be sold for their mutual benefit in ...specified proportions .. .the transaction, in the absence of some
special provision of the contract, indicating that the parties
intended to assume some other relation, has, almost invariably, been construed to be one of the joint adventure as
30
to give each of the parties . ..an interest in the property.
Since the decision in Realty Development Co. rested on the
absence of an agreement to share profits and losses, this case could
have been decided on the basis of the Fedderson and Austin cases
cited above. The remaining two criteria set up by the court (joint
interest in the property and conduct showing cooperation in the
project) were not necessary to the decision. Future litigants seeking
to establish the existence of a joint venture, however, should expect
to have to meet all three criteria recited in Realty.
23 White v. Houston Lumber Co., 179 Okla. 89, 64 P.2d 908 (1937).
24 387 P.2d at 899. (Emphasis added by the court.)
25 112 Colo. 38, 145 P.2d 981 (1944).
26 181 Okla. 122, 72 P.2d 829 (1937).
27 112 Colo. at 47, 145 P.2d 981, 985.
28 89 Colo. 177, 300 Pac. 364 (1931).
29 33 C. J. Joint Adventures § 16 (1924).
30 89 Colo. at 181, 300 Pac. 364, 366.
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ONE YEAR REVIEW OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
By LAWRENCE D. LAYERS
I. RULE 16
Rule 16 of the Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure has raised
relatively few problems in the Colorado courts. As an inevitable
result, the scope of the trial judge's authority in pre-trial proceedings remains somewhat shrouded in mystery. One case in 1963,
Glisan v. Kurth,1 served to lift a corner of the shroud: Glisan, the
defendant in an action for damages brought by Kurth, sought to
make Moore Realty Company a third party defendant in the suit.
His third party complaint and his amended third party complaint
were dismissed on Moore's motion for failure to state a claim. A
pre-trial conference was held during which the court ordered
Glisan to submit to all parties a list of witnesses and a "brief statement concerning the subject matter of their testimony" together
with his second amended third party complaint. The list of witnesses
was submitted, but the substance of their proposed testimony apparently was not. The court dismissed the second amended third
party complaint solely because of Glisan's failure to detail testimony
expected to be produced in support of it.
The supreme court, Pringle, J., reversed.
While a court may certainly order parties to furnish
opposing counsel with the names of witnesses to be called
at the trial, and to make a general statement of the issues
and subject matter to which this testimony will be directed,
such authority does not permit the court to dismiss a case
because the complaining party is unable to detail specifically the evidence such witnesses will give, especially where
some of those witnesses are adverse.2
Although this case is, strictly speaking, one of first impression
in the Colorado courts, it is believed to be consistent with the purposes of pre-trial procedures and with the general import of prior
related cases. "[P] re-trial conferences are not intended, nor have
they ever been, to serve as a substitute for the regular trial of
cases." 3 Rule 16 does not provide an alternative for discovery proceedings4 and for this reason does not require a "disclosure of the
details of the issues to be made by the pleadings."5 It does not "compel the production of any documents or force the making of any admissions." 6 Furthermore, it "confers no special powers of dismissal
not otherwise contained in the rules."'7 Even the power to preclude
issues from trial "should be exercised only to the extent necessary
to achieve the desired purpose - that is, an entirely just disposition
of the case in a speedy and efficient manner."s
This last statement must be emphasized. Although the purpose
of Rule 16 is expediency, it is just expediency - to secure early
Junior Student, University of Denver College of Low.
1 384 P.2d 946 (Colo. 1963).
2 Id. at 949.
.3 Lynn v. Smith, 281 F.2d 501, 506 (3d Cir. 1960).
4 Markle v. Sordoni, 64 Pa. D. & C. 424 (1948).
5 Duffy v. Gross, 121 Colo. 198, 214 P.2d 498 (1950).
6 McCoy v. District Court of Lorimer County, 126 Colo. 32, 246 P.2d 6119 (1952).
7 Syracuse Broadcasting Corp. v. Newhouse, 271 F.2d 910, 914 (2d Cir. 1959).
8 Id. at 915.
*
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settlements of cases without sacrifice of the substantive or procedural rights of the parties. Allowing the judge to pass on the
weight of proposed evidence, no matter how detailed its description
or how weakly controverted the issue, would be such a sacrifice of
rights. It would be in effect the equivalent of a forced admission
or other equally serious denial of due process.
II.

RULE

24

One case in 1963, Roosevelt v. Beau Monde Co.,9 dealt with Rule
24, R.C.P. Colo., Intervention. Beau Monde Co. sought to build a
shopping center on land in the City of Englewood but was denied
a building permit on the grounds that the property was zoned R-1-A.
The company filed an action against the city and its building inspector to compel the issuance of the permit. Roosevelt and ten
others moved to intervene as owners and occupants of residence
properties "immediately abutting the subject property." The land
of six of the intervenors was alleged to be in Englewood but that
of the other five was alleged to be in the town of Cherry Hills
Village which adjoins Englewood. In their motion the intervenors
alleged a diversity of interest between themselves and the city, and,
consequently, inadequate representation. The supreme court, Hall,
J., reversed the ruling of the District Court of Arapahoe County
denying intervention, and remanded with directions to grant the
motion.
To the best of my knowledge, this is the first reported case
in which the intervenors in a zoning case were from without the
zoning municipality. Far from prohibiting this, the Colorado court
took it as evidence that since "Englewood is without authority to
employ counsel to represent such persons and any effort to do so
would be outside of and beyond the scope of its power-'"10 the residents of Cherry Hills Village were without any representation and
thus came within the provision of Rule 24(a) (2), allowing intervention of right.
Perhaps a more interesting aspect of the case is provided by
an analysis of the court's path to its conclusion that all the plaintiffs in error were entitled to intervene as of right. Rule 24, R.C.P.
Colo., provides in pertinent part:
(a) Intervention of Right. Upon timely application anyone shall be permitted to intervene in an action: . . . (2)
when the representation of the applicant's interest by existing parties is or may be inadequate and the applicant is or
may be bound by a judgment in the action . ...
(b) Permissive Intervention. Upon timely application
anyone may be permitted to intervene in an action .... (2)
when an applicant's claim or defense and the main action
have a question of law or fact in common ....
There was no question as to the timeliness of the application.
Futhermore, the court gave indication that, even if it had not been
admitted by the parties, the court would have found that "there can
be no doubt that the rights of those seeking intervention will be
9 394 P.2d 96 (Colo. 1963).
10 Id. at 100.
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bound by any judgment in the case."" The court cited no authority,
but there is some precedent for this view."
As can be readily seen, there remains but to establish that "the
representation of the applicant's interest by existing parties is or
may be inadequate" in order to bring the case within Rule 24(a).
I have already noted that the court concluded for the nonresident
applicants that no representation was inadequate representation.
The court also concluded that the remaining applicants were entitled to intervention under Rule 24(a), but it chose a method of
reaching this conclusion that can only be termed confusing.
The court cites Wolpe v. Poretsky1" as a comparable situation
in which intervention was allowed. The situation was indeed comparable and intervention was allowed, but in Wolpe the intervenors
relied solely on Rule 24 (b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
(a duplicate of Colorado Rule 24 (b)), and the court was forced to
make its decision on that basis. Consequently, the conclusion drawn
by the court that the appellants might intervene as of right must be
regarded as mere dictum, a fact which renders the case at best a
weak precedent for the present decision.
The second case cited as authority is Herzog v. City of Pocatello.44 Herzog is also decided on the basis of Rule 24 (b), the Idaho
rule being identical to that of Colorado. In fact, a portion of the
opinion quoted by the Colorado court in the present case conclusively demonstrates this: "We are of the view that appellants' defense and the main action have a question of law in common and
that appellants have sufficient interest in the matter in litigation
to entitle them to intervene."' 15
The supreme court then goes on to cite, apparently as an apology for its failure to utilize cases dealing with the proper portion
of the rule, Textile Workers Union of America v. Allendale Co., 16
which is concerned with the permissibility of intervention in a review of an administrative proceeding. The court in that case was
bent upon enlarging the scope of allowable intervention to include
situations not expressly covered by Rule 24 but in which the court
finds a sound reason for intervention. Since in the present case the
court brings the facts within the express terms of Rule 24 (a), the
Textile Worker case would seem to be largely irrelevant.
In Kozak v. Wells' 7 the court at last finds a case dealing with
Rule 24(a) (2), but it deals neither with zoning nor with the adequacy of representation of property owners whose property was
affected merely by virtue of propinquity. It is a title action and the
eventuality which entitles the intervenors to have their petition
granted is that their title may actually be placed in jeopardy.
It is clear, therefore, that the case is not precedent for the
proposition that contiguous landowners in a zoning action are or
may be inadequately represented by city officials. It is not clear
upon what basis the court does place its reliance. An educated guess
would be that it is merely that Rule 24 is to be liberally construed11 Ibid.
12
13
14
15
16
17

Wolpe v.
Ibid.
82 Idaho
356 P.2d
226 F.2d
278 F.2d

Poretsky, 144 F.2d 505 (D.C.

Cir. 1944).

505, 356 P.2d 54 (1960).
a 56, quoted in 384 P.2d at 102.
765 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
104 (8th Cir. 1960).
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that a certainty of inadequate representation is not required, a mere
possibility being sufficient. This point was, indeed, dealt upon at
length in Kozak but is not mentioned in the rather cryptic passage
quoted by Mr. Justice Hall. The entire reference is as follows:
In Kozak v. Wells, 8 Cir., 278 F.2d 104, 84 A.L.R.2d 1400, it
is said:
"We are influenced, also, by the realization that the
allowance of intervention here will be in line with the command of Rule 1, F.R.C.P., that the rules 'be construed to
secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of
every action' * * *
"In summary, therefore, we conclude that the appellants are entitled to intervene of right. Like Ford, supra,
[249 F.2d 27.] we regard this case as one where 'the practical necessities grant the applicant an absolute right to intervene.' * * *."Is
Reading this, one would be inclined to believe that Kozak was
on all fours with the Beau Monde fact situation, an entirely misleading impression.
The subsequent citation of Ford Motor Co. v. Bisanz Bros.,
Inc.19 is equally unclear. It states enough of the facts of the case to
show that the intervenor's interest has nothing to do with rights
of a property owner and then says: "This, we think, is a situation
where 'the practical necessities grant the applicant an absolute
right to intervene.' . . . o20
I must confess that I do not understand how it is that the fact
that a customer of a railroad should be allowed to intervene in a
suit to enjoin the railroad from providing service because it is a
"practical necessity" has any bearing upon whether it is such a
practical necessity to allow the present intervention. I assume the
court wished to show that "practical necessities" denote an absolute right to intervene. It does not say so, nor does it make any
visible attempt to show that such necessity existed.
In both of these last two references, Kozak and Ford, isolated
segments of the opinions were quoted out of context without revealing the purpose for which the quotations were made. This, of
course, makes me wonder if there was, in fact, any compelling
reason that they should be included. The fact that I happen to
have found more or less relevant rules of law in the cases cited is
no certain indication that the citations were made to establish the
existence of those rules. I cannot help but feel that this is a situation in which the court determined that it wanted to allow
intervention but was unable to find a sequence of logical steps
which would inevitably lead to the required conclusion that the
intervenors might not be adequately represented. It therefore
seems to have secreted a cloud of intervention cases in the general
direction of zoning and run from point A to point B under cover
of the opaque fog. The squid has developed this technique to a fine
art.
Actually, the court found what I believe to be sufficient rea1.9384 P.2d at 102.
19249 F.2d 22 (8th Cir. 1957).
20 384 P.2d at 103.
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son to determine the case as it did without going through the
tedious task of citing pointless cases. "Possibly, and probably, Englewood would benefit by the construction of the shopping center, and yet certain individual residents and
property owners be
21
adversely affected by such constructions." '
Since there are cases in other jurisdictions holding on both
sides of the question of adequacy of representation in similar zoning
cases,22 the decision really boils down to one of policy and could
conceivably be made in either direction. But in making a policy
decision, if it is necessary to cite cases, it would seem to be the
wiser course to cite applicable ones, or at least to expressly recognize the deficiencies of the almost relevant ones rather than to
make abstruse and confusing references in the sublime confidence
that it doesn't really matter anyway since the decision is obviously
the equitable one.
III.

RULE

59

In a series of five cases, the supreme court reiterated the necessity under Rule 59 (f) of filing a motion for new trial as a prerequisite to review on writ of error. Minshall v. Pettit2 3 held that such
a motion was required even after a mere hearing for the granting or
denying of a temporary injunction. This ruling was followed by
Bayers v. W.O.W., Inc.,24 Chief Justice Frantz dissenting on the
ground that "failure to file a motion for a new trial in the trial court
is an irregularity . ..such irregularity can be waived."
Noice v. Jorgenson2 5 and Denver Feed Co. v. Winters26 further
established that, after a trial to the court, "the filing of objections to
findings of the trial court (under Rule 52 (b)) clearly do [sic] not
serve as a motion for new trial and do [sic] not constitute a compliance with Rule 59."27
In Martinez v. Bond, "" Martinez' complaint was dismissed by the
trial court on the ground that it failed to state a claim upon which
relief could be granted. The writ of error was dismissed, even
though there was no trial to begin with, because there was no
motion for a new trial or order of the trial court dispensing therewith.
29
But in a sixth case, Noland v. Colorado School of Trades, Inc.,
the court carved out an exception to its seemingly well-established
rule. The trial court had granted the defendant school's motion for
a judgment non obstante veredicto, vacating a 16,000 dollar judgment in favor of Noland. Noland elected to stand on the record as
made and seek review of the single question of whether the trial
court erred in granting the motion for judgment n.o.v. The school
moved to dismiss the writ of error on the ground that a "Motion for
21 384 P.2d at 101.
22 Intervention allowed of right: Oakton Crawford Corp. v. Village of Skokie, 28 III. App. 2d
507, 171 N.E.2d 814 (1961); East Maine Township Community Ass'n v. Pioneer Trust & Say. Bank,
15 Ill. App. 2d 250, 145 N.E.2d 777 (1957). Intervention not of right: Glenel Realty Corp. v. Worthington, 4 App. Div. 2d 202, 164 N.Y.S.2d 635 (1957), appeal dismissed, 3 N.Y.2d 924, 167 N.Y.S.2d
939, 145 N.E.2d 880 (1957).
23 379 P.2d 394 (Colo. 1963).
24 379 P.2d 815 (Colo. 1963).
25 378 P.2d 835 (Colo. 1963).
26 380 P.2d 678 (Colo. 1963).
27 Id. at 679.
28 379 P.2d 808 (Colo. 1963).
29 386 P.2d 358 (Colo. 1963).
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a New Trial" was not filed by Noland following the entry of judgment. The supreme court denied this motion, saying:
He is not compelled by Rule 59 (f) R.C.P. Colo., to file a
motion for new trial in circumstances where he doesn't
want a new trial. If he elects to stand upon the record as
made he is not compelled to run the risk involved in filing
a motion for a new trial, which, if granted, would deprive
him of his right to review upon the question of whether the
court erred
in entering a judgment notwithstanding the
30
verdict.
The analogy drawn by the court is to the right of a litigant
adversely affected by a grant of a new trial to stand upon the record
as made and thereby secure a review of the single question of
whether the trial court erred in granting such motion.
The exception as it appears in this case seems to be a wholly
admirable one. Without it, a party might be deprived of a beneficial
jury verdict by the error of the trial court. He would be caught on
the horns of a dilemma: without the motion he could not secure
review; with it he might be required to undergo the expense and
risk of another trial which he does not want. It would be foolish to
require him to file his motion and then to allow him to stand on the
record of the first trial in the second trial, entirely unwanted by
either side, in order to review the granting of a judgment n.o.v.
The question arises as to whether the exception should be
limited to the facts of this case or should be extended to any situation in which the litigant does not want a new trial. The closest
analogy would be in the case of a party adversely affected by a
motion to alter or amend a judgment under Rule 59 (e). The same
reasoning as above applies.
There is a more common example. A party adversely affected
by the granting of a motion for new trial may "stand upon the
record as made" and refuse to take part in the new trial, which
then proceeds to a judgment against him. He may then secure a
review of the trial court's ruling on the motion without going
through the motion of moving for a third trial.3 1 Indeed, it would
be sheer formalism to require him to make such a motion.
Thus it would seem that there is no reason to require a motion
for new trial in any case in which a litigant wishes to reinstate a
favorable verdict or judgment that has been vacated by a judicial
act. Additionally, there does not seem to be any other situation in
which a litigant would not prefer a new trial to any other permissible action by the appellate court. It is therefore concluded that the
exception which the court has made to Rule 59(f) in the instant
case is a wise one in its generality.
IV.

60
Brief mention should perhaps be made of Terry v. Terry,32 if
only to emphasize that it is possible to seek equitable relief from a
judgment in either of two ways: by motion under Rule 60 (b) or by
an independent action.
RULE

30 Id. at 361.
31 Lehrer v. Lorenzen, 124 Colo. 17, 233 P.2d 382 (1951).
32 387 P.2d 902 (Colo. 1963).
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Relief from a decree in a divorce proceeding was sought pertaining to the question of alimony. The defendant moved to dismiss
for lack of jurisdiction because: (1) "the judgment from which
plaintiff seeks relief is more than six months old and plaintiff is
barred in this proceeding by Rule 60 (b) of the Colorado Rules of
Civil Procedure," and (2) the issue of alimony was or "should have
been before the court at the time of the entry of the aforementioned
divorce decree" and was therefore res judicata.13
The trial court granted the motion, but the supreme court reversed in an opinion by Mr. Justice McWilliams that was short and
to the point. Since this was an independent action and not a motion
under Rule 60 (b), "the six months time limitation contained in said
rule has no application." The only applicable limitations of time
were laches and the statute of limitations. These, like res judicata,
are affirmative defenses and, under Rule 8 (c), R.C.P. Colo., must be
affirmatively pleaded. I must say that, in my opinion, seldom has
such a summary defeat been so richly deserved.
V.

RULE

98

4
City & County of Denver v. Glendale Water & Sanitation Dist.a
is a completely orthodox case, but since there are so few cases dealing with Rule 98(a), a very brief outline of it without comment
might be of some use.
Denver wanted to enjoin the Sanitation District from constructing a sewage plant on the ground that it would deposit sewage in
the channel of Cherry Creek which would, in turn, carry it through
Denver. The only part of the case on writ of error that is important
for our purposes is Denver's contention that the order for change
of venue from the City and County of Denver to Arapahoe County,
where the Sanitation District is located, was erroneously issued.
Rule 98 (a), R.C.P. Colo., reads as follows: "All actions affecting
property, franchises, or utilities shall be tried in the county in
which the subject of the action, or a substantial part thereof, is
situated."
The court first held that the Sanitation District is a municipal
utility within the meaning of Rule 98 (a) and should have been sued
in the county in which it was located. Mr. Chief Justice Frantz then
went on to say:
In ascertaining the venue of an injunctive proceeding, the
court should probe for the primary purpose of the suit. If
the suit for injunction is not ancillary-and in this case it is
not-, and if the decree sought would operate as restraint
upon the person, it is clearly an action in personam. [Citations ommitted.]
There is no merit in the contention of Denver that this is
an action affecting property [Cherry Creek] .... At best,
property is indirectly affected. But it is not
3 5 sufficient to
establish venue for a suit affecting property.
The change of venue, therefore, was properly made.
33 Id. at 903.
34 380 P.2d 553 (Colo. 1963).
35 Id. at 554.
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Rippy v. Cowieson has no place in this ordered scheme of
things because it seems simultaneously to deal with everything and
nothing. No rule of civil procedure is mentioned, no case is cited,
and the only statute referred to deals with the construction of reservoirs. Yet it is obviously a civil procedure case and equally obviously it reaches the most equitable decision and properly reprimands a wayward trial judge.
The case arises out of an oral "cost plus" contract to grade a
road and construct a reservoir on defendant's land. Although many
alterations in design were made, including a change in the height of
the dam from five or six feet to twenty, defendant refused to pay
the plaintiff contractors' bill of almost five times the two thousand
dollar estimate.
At the trial one of the plaintiffs stated on cross-examination
that the height of the dam had been increased to twenty feet and
that no approval for its construction had been obtained from the
state engineer. The defendant immediately moved for dismissal on
the grounds that C.R.S. '53 § 147-5-537 had not been complied with,
that therefore by the terms of the statute the work was not completed, and that payment was not to become due until the work was
completed. From this motion proceeded a veritable comedy of
errors, the final curtain of which never fell.
The trial court entered its order of dismissal over the plaintiffs'
plaintive objection that they had not completed their case. The
poor plaintiffs, still game if a little battered by this wholly unexpected turn of events, asked that the order be vacated. Denied.
They then asked for a reinstatement and a continuance, and that
the defendant be directed to cooperate in securing the necessary
approval from the state engineer's office. Denied, and formal judgment entered. The judgment very obligingly included findings of
fact and conclusions of law to the effect that, since by operation of
the statute on facts admitted by the plaintiffs, the contract had not
been completed, the action was premature and was dismissed without prejudice. Motion for new trial was dispensed with.
Of course, there is the minor point to be considered that the
completion of the contract was not put in issue by the pleadings,
defendant having admitted some liability to the plaintiffs, nor had
the pleadings been amended. Apparently such a simple consideration as amendment was not thought by the defendant to be dramatic enough.
Whereupon the plaintiffs filed their writ of error.
The setting of act two of our little play is the briefs of the
parties before the supreme court. In view of the course later taken
36 379 P.2d 396 (Colo. 1963).
37 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 147-5-5 (1953) reads as follows: "Approval of plans for reservoir. - No
reservoir of a capacity of more than one thousand acre-feet or having a dam or embankment in excess
of ten feet in vertical height, or having a surface area at high water in excess of twenty acres
shall hereafter be constructed in this state except that the plans and specifications for the same shall
have first been approved by the state engineer and filed in his office. The state engineer shall act
as consulting engineer during the construction thereof, and shall have authority to require the
material used and the work of construction to be done to his satisfaction. No work shall be deemed
complete until the state engineer shall furnish to the owners of such structures a written statement
of the work of consruction and the full completion thereof, together with his acceptance of the same,
which statement shall specify the dimensions of such dam and capacity of such reservoir."
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by the court, only one of the plaintiffs' arguments on appeal is important: "Rule 8(c) and Rule 12 (b), R.C.P. Colo., require the defendant to plead 147-5-5, C.R.S. 1953, as an affirmative defense if it
is to be urged affirmatively or in avoidance. Such a defense cannot
be raised in the middle of a trial on motion, especially without
amendment of the pleadings. '3 Plaintiffs being the "straight men"
and heroes of our drama, this statement appears to be substantially
correct. But does it not seem strange that there is no mention in the
brief of Rule 41 (b) (1), which provides for motion for dismissal "on
ground that upon the facts and the law the plaintiff has shown no
right to relief," after the plaintiff has completed the presentation of
his evidence? No mention is made by the plaintiff of the propriety
of such a motion before the completion of plaintiffs' case.
The defendant's answer was, inter alia, that this was not a new
defense at all but a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction which,
under Rule 12 (h) (2), R.C.P. Colo., may be interposed at any time.
the case, but never fear. The defendant did not press the point, and
the word was not heard again. The defendant's major concern was
whether the contract was or was not completed. He seems to have
assumed that his motion was on jurisdictional grounds with the
same certainty that the plaintiffs assumed that it was not.
Enter, then, the supreme court for the denouement. Mr. Justice
Hall's opinion states that "the trial court disregarded the issues as
38 Brief of plaintiffs in error, p. 10.
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made by the pleadings, made no findings or disposition of any issue
before the court, and made findings on matters that were not a part
of the pleadings or before the court for determination." This is true.
It emphasizes that the issues made by the pleadings remain undetermined. Then, like a true deus ex machina, the opinion concludes that "it was error for the trial court to suspend the taking of
testimony and to entertain the motion to dismiss." Exit.
In summary, the opinion is almost totally ambiguous. We know
that Judge Blickhahn in the trial court did something wrong, but
we do not know precisely what it was. Is it always error to grant
a defendant's motion to dismiss under Rule 41 (b) before the termination of the plaintiff's case, or is it so only when there are no findings of fact and conclusions of law on the issues in the pleadings?
I might add as an aside here that the only reason I believe this to
be a 41(b) motion is that, according to Rule 52 (a), "Findings of
fact and conclusions of law are unnecessary on decisions of motions
under rules 12 or 56 or any other motion except as provided in rule
41 (b)"; and Mr. Justice Hall emphasized the absence of such findings and conclusions. The answer to the ambiguity is not provided
by the opinion.
It should be mentioned that during the entire play there was a
ghost in the wings: Rule 111 (a) (1); the final judgment rule. The
judgment of dismissal was without prejudice. There seems to have
been a tacit agreement to consider this unimportant, but several
jurisdictions hold that a dismissal without prejudice is not a final
judgment. 39 Others, of course, hold that it is final.40 Wyoming has
an odd case which recognizes that there is no unanimity on the
subject, but says that since the attorneys did not argue the point,
the supreme court would accept the apparent opinion of the parties
that the judgment was final. It adds that the trial court should not
dismiss without prejudice
unless it intends thereby to say that the
41
order is not final.
I am not advocating that any particular rule be adopted here.
I just feel that it is worthy of comment that a point of jurisdictional
importance, by an adverse decision of which this case could never
have been decided, has never been dealt with in Colorado. In fact,
the only Colorado case ever to deal with the finality of any dismissal 42 was decided in 1878, and furthermore cannot mean what it
says: "A judgment of nonsuit rendered by the court in the exercise
of this power is, as to the defendant, in invitum; is a complete disposition of the case, and is final within the meaning of the statute
concerning appeals."'43 The judgment is without the consent of the
plaintiff, not the defendant. Does it not seem that this -question
merits more than tacit consideration by the courts?
39 Estes v. Gatliff, 291 Ky. 93, 163 S.W.2d 273 (1942); Sand v. Queen City Packing Co., 108
N.W.2d 448 (N.D. 1961); Mallory v. Taylor, 90 Va. 348, 18 S.E. 438 (1898); Marcus v. McClure, 63
W. Va. 215, 59 S.E. 1055 (1907). See also Dent v. Dolan, 220 Ore. 313, 349 P.2d 500 (1960). Note
that some of these cases deal with voluntary rather than involuntary dismissal.
40 Grubbs v. Slater & Gilroy, Inc., 267 S.W.2d 754 (Ky. 1954); C.I.T.Corp. v. Teogue, 293 Ky.
521, 169 S.W.2d 593 (1943); Gross v. Stone, 173 Md. 653, 197 AtI. 137 (1938); First Nat'l Bank of
Jackson v. Graham, 242 Miss. 879, 137 So. 2d 193 (1962); Atkins v. Chamberlain, 164 Neb. 482, 82
N.W.2d 632 (1957); Hoffman v. Knaus, 135 N.E.2d 700 (Ohio Ct. App. 1952).
41 Thompson v. Searl, 76 Wyo. 264, 301 P.2d 804 (1956).
42 Corning Tunnel Co. v. Pell, 4 Colo. 184 (1878).
43 Ibid.
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ONE YEAR REVIEW OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
By
I.

JOHN CAREY*

CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE CRIMINAL DEFENDANT
AND THE CONVICT

A. Double Jeopardy
In Krutka v. Spinuzzi1 the court was presented with the question whether a retrial of Spinuzzi, who had been acquitted of murder, would be in violation of his right under the Colorado Constitution not to be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense.- At his
trial, after presentation of the State's evidence, Spinuzzi had obtained a directed verdict of not guilty on the grounds that the evidence was legally insufficient. The State brought error under a
statute providing for review of criminal cases on behalf of the
State, 3 whereupon the supreme court "disapproved" the action of
the trial court.4 Spinuzzi was then rearrested upon the issuance of
an alias capias. He applied for and was granted a writ of habeas
corpus on the grounds of double jeopardy, and the sheriff to whom
the writ was directed sought a review of that decision.
Before the supreme court, Spinuzzi argued that he had been
placed in jeopardy at the moment the jury in the original trial was
impaneled and sworn; a retrial on the same charge therefore would
not only violate his rights under the Colorado Constitution 5 but also
was prohibited by the statute which had authorized the review of
his acquittal. 6 The statute contains an express limitation that it shall
not be construed "so as to place a defendant in jeopardy a second
time for the same offense."
The sheriff argued in reply that under the Colorado Constitution a defendant is not deemed to have been in jeopardy if a criminal judgment is reversed for an error of law and that therefore the
defendant had not yet been placed in jeopardy. Furthermore, even
if he had been in jeopardy, it was a continuing one which would
not be terminated until the completion of a trial free from error.
The court rejected the "single and continuing jeopardy" concept, stating in answer to Krutka's argument (the concept is logical
and appeals to the common sense): "We are not permitted to be
governed by our personal concept as to what the law in this regard
ought to be, but rather to determine what the law, in Colorado, is."'7
The most important development of the case is the interpretation of article II, section 18, of the Colorado Constitution., It has
long been established that, by virtue of this section, a defendant
Senior student, University of Denver College of Low.
1 384 P.2d 928 (Colo. 1963).
2 Colo. Const. art. 11, § 18. "No person shall be compelled to testify against himself in a criminal
case nor shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. If the jury disagree, or
if the judgment be arrested after the verdict, or if the judgment be reversed for error in law,
the accused shall not be deemed to have been in jeopardy."
3 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 39.7-27 (1953). "Writs of error shall lie on behalf of the state, or the people,
to review decisions of the trial court in any criminal case upon question of law arising upon the
trial ....
Nothing in this section shall be construed so as to place a defendant in jeopardy a
second time for the same offense."
4 People v. Spinuzzi, 149 Colo. 391, 369 P.2d 427 (1962).
5 Supro, note 2.
6 Supra, note 3.
7 384 P.2d at 935.
8 Supro, note 2.
*

DENVER LAW CENTER JOURNAL

VOL.

XLI

who obtains a reversal of his conviction may not avoid a second
trial for the same offense on grounds of multiple jeopardy. 9 The
same is true of the "implied acquittal" of the greater offense
charged when the defendant appeals the conviction of a lesser included offense. 10 The supreme court has not previously had occasion to determine the effect of the section on the status of a defendant whose acquittal has been reversed at the instance of the State."
Although it could be argued that it did not have such an occasion
in this case,'12 the court nevertheless determined to decide the issue.
It rejected the sheriff's argument by examining the "state of things
existing when the constitution was framed and adopted, ' 13 and concluding:
As of 1876 only the defendant had the right to a writ
of error in a criminal proceeding. Hence, when read in this
context, Article II, section 18 of the Colorado Constitution
was of necessity only intended to preclude a defendant who
on appeal obtained a reversal of his judgment of conviction
from thereafter claiming former jeopardy
when the state
14
sought to try him for the same offense.
In other words, the constitution does not preclude the defendant
from claiming former jeopardy if the State secures a reversal of
his judgment of acquittal.
This decision seems to be in line with the general import of a
number of Colorado cases. In nearly every criminal case in which
the State has obtained a review of an acquittal and in which the
supreme court has found error, the action of the trial court has not
been reversed but merely "disapproved.' 15 This disapproval was
made over the persistent contention that the cases should be reversed, 16 a clear indication that the court recognized that a question of
double jeopardy would arise as a result of such a reversal.
Although this article is concerned primarily with the constitution, it seems advisable to consider briefly what influence Krutka
v. Spinuzzi will have on the efficacy of C.R.S. '53 § 39-7-27.17 Since
the court expressly declared that the statute was "not at odds" with
the constitution,' 8 the State will continue to have the right in a
criminal proceeding to secure a review of an acquittal. But it will
not be able in such a review to obtain a reversal of the judgment.
9 Packer v. People, 8 Colo. 361, 8 Pac. 564 (1885); Garvey's Case, 7 Colo. 384, 3 Pac. 903 (1884).
10 Young v. People, 54 Colo. 293, 130 Pac. 1011 (1913).
11 Only one previous review under this statute "upon question of law arising upon the trial"
has resulted in a reversal. People v. Cox, 123 Colo. 179, 228 P.2d 163 (1951). In that case the
district attorney elected not to proceed further. In two other cases, decided on the some day and
arising out of the same incident, the court "disapproved and reversed" in short opinions by Mr.
Justice Burke. People v. Shirley, 72 Colo. 120, 210 Pac. 327 (1922); People v. Corbett, 72 Colo.
117, 209 Pac. 808 (1922).
12 The action of the trial court was not reversed in People v. Spinuzzi, supra, note 2, only "disapproved." Therefore, the constitutional provision relied upon by Krutka is, strictly speaking, not
applicable at all and need not be construed. Perhaps the court felt that the time had come to resolve the question raised by the dissents in the cases cited in footnote 16, infra.
13 384 P.2d at 933.
14 Ibid.
15 People v. Futamata, 140 Colo. 233, 343 P.2d 1058 (1959); People v. Gomez, 131 Colo. 476,
283 P.2d 949 (1955); People v. Wilson, 106 Colo. 435, 106 P.2d 1063 (1940); Peaple v. Kilpatrick,
79 Colo. 303, 245 Pac. 719 (1926); People v. Bartels, 77 Colo. 498, 238 Pac. 51 (1925); People v.
Bright, 77 Colo. 563, 238 Pac. 71 (1925). But see People v. Cox, 123 Colo. 179, 228 P.2d 163
(1951); People v. Snirley, 72 Colo. 120, 210 Pac. 327 (1922); People v. Corbett, 72 Colo. 117, 209
Pac. 808 (1922).
16 People v. Byrnes, 117 Colo. 528, 190 P.2d 584 (1948) (dissent by Mr. Justice Burke); People v.
Rapini, 107 Colo. 363, 112 P.2d 551 (1941) (concurring opinion by Mr. Justice Burke, joined by Mr.
Justice Bouck); People v. Wilson, 106 Colo. 435, 106 P.2d 1063 (1940) (concurring opinion by Mr.
Justice Burke, joined by Mr. Justice Young).
17 Supro, note 3.
18 384 P.2d at 931.
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It is apparent, therefore, that a "disapproval" of the case can have
no adverse effect upon the defendant. This being so, there is nothing
to persuade him to argue the case before the supreme court.1 9 The
ultimate effect of this decision, then, is that the supreme court will
be called upon to render an advisory opinion that can have effect
only on future decisions based upon unilateral argument. Is it reasonable or just to adjudge defendants in those future cases by rules
of law established without the benefit of adversary proceedings?
B. Equal Protection or Due Process
In Vanderhoof v. People20 the defendant was charged under
C.R.S. '53 § 40-2-3221 with four counts of indecent liberties. The district attorney withdrew three charges and the defendant pleaded
guilty to one charge. Before accepting the defendant's plea, the
court warned him it would subject him to a possible term of imprisonment of fourteen years in the state penitentiary. The court then
accepted the plea and, following procedures set forth in the Sex
Offenders Act, 22 sentenced the defendant to not less than one day
nor more than life in the state penitentiary.
A petition in the district court to correct judgment and sentence
to conform with the maximum penalty of ten years under C.R.S.
'53 § 40-2-32 was denied, and the defendant brought error to the
Supreme Court of Colorado alleging:
(1) the Sex Offenders Act constitutes a denial of the equal
protection of the law since it prescribes a penalty different
from that of C.R.S. '53 § 40-2-32; the state therefore treats
19 In fact, no appearance was made for Spinuzzi in People v. Spinuzzi, 149 Colo. 391, 369 P.2d
427 (1962).
20 380 P.2d 903 (Colo. 1963).
21 "Assault on child under sixteen.-Any person over the age of fourteen years who shall assault any child under sixteen years of age and shall take indecent and improper liberties with the
person of such child, or who shall entice, allure or persuade any such child into any room, office
or to any other place for the purpose of taking such immodest, immoral and indecent liberties
with such child, or who shall take or attempt to take such liberties with the person of such child
at any place, shall be deemed a felonious assaulter, and, upon conviction thereof, shall be punished, if over eighteen years of age, by confinement in the penitentiary for a term of not more
than ten years, and, if under eighteen years of age, may be punished by commitment to the state
reformatory or to the state industrial school."
22Cola. Rev. Stat. §§ 39-19-1 to -10 (Perm. Supp. 1960).-"Indeterminate sentences to institutions.-For the better administration of justice and the more efficient control, treatment and rehabilitation of persons convicted of the crimes of indecent liberties, incest, assault with intent to commit unnatura carnal copulation, assault with intent to commit rape, if the district court is of the
opinion that any such person, if at large, constitutes a threat of bodily harm to members of the
public, or is an habitual offender and mentally ill, the district court in lieu of the sentence now
provided by low, for each such crime, may sentence such person to a state institution for an indeterminate term having a minimum of one day and a maximum of his natural life."
Sections 2 to 10 set forth the procedure to be followed when one is sentenced pursuant to the
Sex Offenders Act.
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a sex offender sentenced under the Act differently from a
sex offender sentenced under § 40-2-32;
(2) the classification of persons under the Sex Offenders Act
is unreasonable, arbitrary and capricious because the classification is determined by the discretion of the sentencing
judge acting solely in his own opinion;
(3) the sentence was void because the defendant was warned
of a possible fourteen years sentence and was subsequently
given an indeterminate sentence which could extend to
life imprisonment.
The court dismissed the first two contentions, holding that the
state legislature can classify persons upon reasonable and natural
distinctions and that under the Sex Offender Act the trial judge
only determines whether the defendant factually comes within the
predetermined classification set forth in the Act; he does not determine the classification. However, the defendant's third contention
created a question technically of first impression in Colorado. The
court, citing three Colorado decisions as authority, 23 stated
[T] he provisions of the statute dealing with arraignment,
advice of counsel, warning as to consequences of the plea,
taking of evidence in mitigation and aggravation, and presentence investigation
are mandatory and a prerequisite
24
under due process.
The court then held that the life sentence imposed by the trial court
was void, as the defendant had not been warned in advance of this
possible consequence of his guilty plea.
The court next considered whether the judgment as well as the
sentence was void and quoting from Little v. People25 held: ". . . a
failure to comply strictly with the statute does not affect the validity of the judgment but only the sentence, and in a proper case
might require the remanding . . . and re - sentencing. '26 Since
the trial court erred in warning the defendant he could receive
fourteen years imprisonment as opposed to only ten years under
the statute the defendant was charged with violating, the supreme
court reversed the judgment of the district court and remanded the
cause with instructions to resentence the defendant within the
limits of one day to ten years.
Adequate support can be found for the court's holding on Vanderhoof's first two contentions, 27 but its treatment of the defendant's
third contention is unclear. The court's reference to "due process"
is perhaps misleading. A mere casual reading of those cases cited
by the court as support for its statement that the provisions of the
statute are mandatory and a prerequisite under due process 28 indicates that those cases were decided solely on statutory interpreta23 Little v. People, 138 Colo. 572, 335 P.2d 863 (1959); Smith v. Best, Warden, 115 Colo. 494,
176 P.2d 686 (1946); Arrano v. People, 24 Colo. 233, 49 Pac. 271 (1897).
24 380 P.2d at 905 (emphasis supplied).
25 138 Colo. 572, 575, 335 P.2d 863, 864 (1959).
26 380 P.2d at 905.
27 Minnesota ex rel. Pearson v. Probate Court, 309 U.S. 270 (1940) (sexual psychopath low held
constitutional on its face as construed by the highest court of the state); People v. Scherbing, 93
Cal. App. 2d 736, 209 P.2d 796 (1949) (Youth Authority Act not violative of equal protection of the
low); People v. Israel, 91 Cal. App. 2d 773, 206 P.2d 62 (1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 838 (1949)
(discretion of trial judge under Habitual Criminal Statute pertains only to sentencing and the
judge properly has discretion to vary punishment); State v. Evans, 73 Idaho 50, 245 P.2d 790 (1952);
People v. Johnson, 412 Ill. 109, 105 N.E.2d 766 (1952), cert. denied, Johnson v. State, 344 U.S. 858
(1954).
28 Supra, note 26.
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tion-not constitutional principles. 9 It is my opinion that the present court used the term "due process" only in the sense of the
"proper statutory procedure" to be followed under C.R.S. '53 §
39-7-8.30
This statute sets forth mandatory procedures for the court to
follow when a defendant wishes to enter a guilty plea. The requirements are divided into two portions-those proceedings which the
court must follow prior to the acceptance of the plea, and those
proceedings to be followed prior to sentencing. 31 The Arrano, Smith,
and Little cases cited by the court as authority for its holding that
a sentence is void if the procedures of C.R.S. '53 § 39-7-35 are not
followed are all concerned with procedural error arising after the
guilty plea has been accepted by the court and prior to the sentencing. In the Vanderhoof case the supreme court had to deal with
error arising both before the acceptance of the guilty plea and before the sentencing. The latter error, i.e., the imposition of a life
sentence when the defendant had only been warned of a possible
fourteen year sentence, was properly disposed of whether the court
based its decision on constitutional or on statutory grounds. If error
appears only at the presentencing stages, only the sentence and not
the judgment should be voided.
The first error committed by the trial court, i.e., the warning
of a possible fourteen year sentence when defendant could only, by
statute, receive a maximum ten year sentence, was error arising
prior to the acceptance of the plea of guilty by the trial court.
Obviously, the supreme court could not remand the cause with instructions to resentence the defendant to a term within the limits
of from one to fourteen years as he was originally instructed by the
trial judge; the statute under which the defendant was charged
permitted a maximum sentence of ten years. The court therefore
had two choices as to its final disposition of the Vanderhoof case:
It could find that both the sentence and the judgment
were void;
32
or it could hold that only the sentence was void.
In choosing the latter alternative, the court relied solely on
language from the Little case. 33 As has been indicated supra, the
court in that case did not consider whether error arising prior to
29 Supra, note 23. All three cases are founded on alleged violations of statute requiring that
when a plea of guilty is accepted by the trial court, if the court possesses any discretion as to
the extent of the punishment, it shall be the duty of the court to examine witnesses as to the
aggravation and mitigation of the offense.
30 "Plea of guilty - court to examine witnesses. - In all cases where the party indicted shall
plead guilty, such plea shall not be entered until the court shall have fully explained to the
accused the consequences of entering such plea, after which, if the party indicted persists in pleading guilty, said plea shall be received and recorded, and the court proceed to render judgment and
execution thereon, as if he had been found guilty by a jury. In all cases where the court possesses
any discretion as to the extent of the punishment, it shall be the duty of the court to examine
witnesses as to the aggravation and mitigation of the offense."
While this statute is not mentioned by name in the court's opinion, the court gives two "hints"
that this statute forms the basis for its decision. First, the court casually makes reference to some
mystical statute, the provisions of which are mandatory and a prerequisite under due process.
Second, Little v. People, Smit+, v. Best, Warden, and Arrono v. People all consider the proper
procedure to be followed under this statute or its predecessors, i.e., Cola. Stat. Ann. ch. 48 § 482
(1935), and Mills' Ann. Stat. § 1463.
31 This division is specifically recognized in Little v. People. "This statute is divided into two
parts, viz: The duty of the trial court to explain the consequences of a plea of guilty before receiving
it; and, the duty of the trial court to examine witnesses as to aggravation and mitigation of the
offense ....
32 While defendant Vanderhoof did not challenge the validity of the trial court's judgment, the
supreme court, of its own initiative, discusses this matter.
33 138 Colo. 572, 575, 335 P.2d 863, 864 (1959). "[A] failure to comply strictly with the statute
does not affect the validity of the judgment but only the sentence, and in a proper case might require
remanding for the taking of evidence and resentencing."
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the acceptance of the guilty plea would void the judgment. 34 Furthermore, while the court in the Little case held that failure to
comply strictly with the provisions of C.R.S. '53 § 39-7-8 would not
void the judgment, the minor error found in that case 35 is not comparable to the error committed by the trial judge in the Vanderhoof
case.
While it may seem that no injustice is done to one who pleads
guilty under the belief that he may receive a fourteen year sentence
when in fact he can only receive a maximum penalty of ten years
imprisonment, I submit that in certain cases a defendant may think
it better to plead "not guilty" when only a short maximum penalty
is involved and plead "guilty" and rely on the leniency of the court
when he may receive a longer maximum penalty. Furthermore,
future cases arising under § 39-7-8 will be founded on error different from that arising in the Vanderhoof case. Will the judgment be
voided when a defendant, charged under a statute providing for a
mandatory penalty of forty years imprisonment, is told by the trial
judge that he may receive only a36ten year maximum imprisonment,
and he thereby pleads "guilty"?
34 The defendant alleged that the court did not sufficiently apprise him of his right to counsel error arising prior to the acceptance of the guilty plea. Since the court found that no error was
committed by the trial judge at this stage of the proceedings, it never decided whether
the judgment would be void if error had been found.
35 The error to which the court was referring when it said " ...
a failure to comply strictly
with the statute does not affect the valildity of the judgment but only the sentence," was the failure
of the court to examine witnesses as to mitigation or aggravation of the offense. Under § 39-7-8,
it is the duty of the court to take such evidence. However, in the Little case, the trial court
asked the defendant if he had any evidence he wished to introduce, and the defendant answered
in the negative. The trial judge did not examine witnesses but considered the Probation Officer's
report and the F.B.I. report as to mitigation or aggravation of the offense. The defendant therefore
had an opportunity to have witnesses examined but waived this method of having the court
apprised of the facts. While the court did not comply strictly with the provisions of § 39-7-8, the
defendant was afforded sufficient opportunity to have witnesses examined.
In the- Vanderhoof case, however, the defendant was incorrectly forewarned of the consequences of his plea. This would seem to be prejudicial error as opposed to failure on the part
of the trial judge to comply strictly with the statutory mandates.
36 An indication of the answer to this question can be found in Glass v. People, 127 Colo. 210,
255 P.2d 738 (1953). The trial judge, pursuant to Colo. Stat. Ann. ch. 48, § 482 (1935), informed
the defendant that he might be subjected to life imprisonment as a result of his guilty plea;
the Habitual Criminal Statute under which the defendant was charged made the imposition of a
life sentence mandatory. The defendant was
sentenced to life imprisonment,
and after
being denied a petition to vacate judgment and sentence, he brought error to the Supreme Court
of Colorado alleging as error the failure of the trial court to properly forewarn him of the consequences of his guilty plea. The court found that under the "facts of the . .. case the right of
defendant to be advised concerning the consequences of his pleas of guilty was sufficiently protected."
The facts of the case show that the trial court made certain the defendant had been informed by
counsel as to the consequences of his plea. Furthermore, the court felt that language employed by
the trial court in informing the defendant of the consequences of his plea was not such as would
deprive the defendant of his rights under the statute. The tenor of the court's opinion, however,
is unclear whether the decision would have been the same had the defendant not been apprised,
by counsel, of the consequences of his plea.
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
C.

Search and Seizure

The Colorado Constitution prohibits "unreasonable searches and
seizures. '37 It does not, however, prohibit the introduction into
evidence 38
of materials obtained in violation of the constitutional
provision.
The Constitution of the United States similarly prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures. 39 It has been interpreted to require
the exclusion of evidence unlawfully obtained. 40 But since the Bill
41
of Rights has been held to apply only to the Federal Government,
the Fourth
Amendment does not require such exclusion in state
42
courts.

Recent United States Supreme Court cases, however, have extended the meaning of "due process of law" as guaranteed against
the states in the Fourteenth Amendment 43 to include unreasonable
searches and seizures, 44 with the result that the federal exclusionary
rule is extended to the state courts. 4 The states remain free to
apply their own evidentiary standards so long as they do not violate
the terms of the Fourteenth
Amendment as interpreted by the
46
Supreme Court as a limit.

In Hernandez v. People47 the Supreme Court of Colorado provided working guidelines for its definition of "unreasonable." Hernandez was arrested under a warrant for assault to murder. In
addition, three search warrants for the seizure of marijuana were
issued. In the affidavits in support of the search warrants, 48 the
affiant swore that "he has reason to believe" that Hernandez had
37 Colo. Const. art. II, § 7. "The people shall be secure in their persons, papers, homes and
effects, from unreasonable searches and seizures; and no warrant to search any place or seize any
person or thing shall issue without describing the place to be searched, or the person or thing to be
seized, as near as may be, nor without probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation reduced
to writing."
38 Williams v, People, 136 Colo. 164, 315 P.2d 189 (1957); Wolf v. People, 117 Cola. 279, 187
P.2d 926 (1947); Bills v. People, 113 Colo. 326, 157 P.2d 139 (1945); Roberts v. People, 78 Colo.
555, 243 Pac. 544 (1925); Massantonio v. People, 77 Colo. 392, 236 Pac. 1019 (1925).
39 U.S. Const. amend. IV. "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized."
40 Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960); Kremen v. United States, 353 U.S. 346 (1957);
Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62 (1954); United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48 (1951); McDonald
v. United States, 335 U.S. 451 (1948); Grau v. United States; 287 U.S. 124 (1932); Go-Bart Importing
Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344 (1931); Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20 (1925); Amos v.
United States, 255 U.S. 313 (1921); Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921); Weeks v. United
States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
41 Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952); Ohio ex rel. Lloyd v. Dollison, 194 U.S. 445 (1904);
Eilenbecker v. District Court, 134 U.S. 31 (1889).
42 Feldman v. United States, 322 U.S. 487 (1943).
43 U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. " . . . nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty
or property without due process of law . . . .
44 Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
45 Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
46 This statement is based upon the following words from the opinion of Mr. Justice Clark on
pages 33 and 34 of Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963): " . .. although the standard of reasonableness is the same under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, the demands of our federal
system compel us to distinguish between evidence held inadmissible because of our supervisory
powers over federal courts and that held inadmissible because prohibited by the United States
Constitution. We reiterate that the reasonableness of a search! is in the first instance a substantive
determination to be made by the trial court from the facts and circumstances of the case and in
light of the 'fundamental criteria' laid down by the Fourth Amendment and in opinions of this
Court applying that Amendment. Findings of reasonableness, of course, are respected only insofar
as consistent with federal constitutional guarantees ....
The States are not . . . precluded from
developing workable rules governing arrests, searches and seizures to meet "the practical demands
of effective criminal investigation and law enforcement' in the States, provided that those rules do
not violate the constitutional proscription of unreasonable searches and seizures and the concomitant
command that evidence so seized is inadmissible against one who has standing to complain."
47 385 P.2d 997 (Colo. 1963).
48 Mr. Justice PrIngle emphasized the fact that the Colorado Constitution requires that probable
cause be supported by oath or affirmation reduced to writing. See note 1, supra.
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the property and that it had been or was intended to be used in the
commission of a criminal offense. The basis of the affiant's belief
was not given.
Hernandez was arrested and searched; a stolen dictating machine was found in his automobile. He was charged with and convicted of receiving stolen property. Before the supreme court on
writ of error, he assigned as error the admission into evidence of
the dictating machine over timely objection.
The supreme court first held that the search warrants were
invalid:
Before the issuing magistrate can properly perform his
official function he must be apprised of the underlying
facts and circumstances which show that there is probable
cause to believe that proper grounds for the issuance of the
warrant exist. Mere affirmance of the belief or suspicion
on the officer's part is not enough. To hold otherwise would
attach controlling significance to the officer's belief rather
than to the magistrate's judicial determination .... Therefore, the affidavits in question here containing only the
conclusion of Officer Borden . . without setting forth facts
and circumstances from which the judicial officer could
determine whether probable cause existed were fatally
de49
fective. The warrants issued thereon were nullities.
It then held that the search, as incident to a lawful arrest, was
unreasonable:
[T]he search, whether under a valid search warrant or
whether as incident to a lawful arrest, must be one in which
the officers are looking for specific articles and must be
conducted in a manner reasonably calculated to uncover
such articles. Any search more extensive than this constitutes a general exploratory search and is squarely within
the interdiction of the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure. 50
Since there is no other way that a search and seizure can be
"reasonable" than under authority of a search warrant or incident
to a lawful arrest, the dictating machine was illegally seized; and
the motion to suppress should have been granted.
In dicta, the court made two other points. An officer conducting "a lawful search, either under a valid search warrant or incident
to a valid arrest where the search is such as is reasonably designed
to uncover the articles he is looking for," 51 may seize any contraband, or article, the possession of which is a crime, which he discovers in the course of the search without fear that it will be excluded from evidence.
Furthermore, any alteration of a search warrant, even correcting an address, by any person other than a judicial officer, is improper. It is not made clear in the decision, however, whether this
invalidates the warrant or leaves it valid according to its original
tenor.
49 385 P.2d at 999.
50 Id. at 1000.
51 Ibid.
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II.

JUDICIAL REVIEW OF CONSTITUTIONAL

QUESTIONS

A.

When the Court Will Decide a Question
Not Raised by the Parties
It is an established principle of constitutional law that only
issues which are duly raised and insisted upon, and are adequately
argued, will be considered; and that generally a court will not in52
quire into the constitutionality of a statute on its own motion.
Yet constitutional questions are often of immediate importance to
the general public as well as to the parties. Recognizing its duty to
resolve such questions where the legislation is "patently unconstitutional and void, and under which many persons are receiving unfair,
discriminatory, and unlawful treatment," the Supreme Court of
Colorado last year considered and determined the constitutionality
of a statute not questioned by either party at trial or on appeal. 53
Under a 1947 act, 54 as amended in 1959, 55 a mosquito control
district along the Animas River Valley and encompassing part of
the City of Durango was created. It included property owned by the
plaintiff in error telephone company. The company petitioned the
district court to declare that its property was not a part of the district, relying on an exclusionary provision of the act. 56 The trial
court construed the provision adversely to the company and denied
the petition.
On appeal the initial briefs and arguments of the parties related
to the construction of the exclusionary clause, but the supreme
52 City of Golden v. Schaul, 105 Colo. 158, 95 P.2d 806 (1939). See also People ex rel. Attorney
General v. Barksdale, 104 Colo. 1, 87 P.2d 755 (1939); Clark Hardware Co. v. Centennial Tunnel
Mining Co., 22 Colo. App. 174, 123 Poc. 322 (1912).
53 Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Animos Mosquito Control Dist., 380 P.2d 560 (1963).
54Colo. Rev. Stat. § 89-3 (1953). This article provides for the establishment of metropolitan
districts for the purpose of water supply, sanitation, fire, police and safety protection. It establishes
organizational procedure, district powers, and procedure for dissolution.
55 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 89-3-2(7) (Perm. Supp. 1960). The amendment provides for the creation of
mosquito control and street improvement districts.
56Colo. Rev Stat. § 89-3-3 (1953). " ...
A district may consist of noncontiguous tracts or
parcels of property but no single tract or parcel of land containing more than twenty acres of which,
together with the buildings, improvements, machinery and equipment thereon situate shall have an
assessed valuation in excess of twenty-five thousand dollars . . . may be included . . . without
written consent of the fee owners ....
"
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court ordered additional briefs and argument on the constitutionality of the section and on whether the balance of the act would
survive if that section were severed.
The court took pains to indicate that its action in considering
the constitutional question was an extraordinary measure, but said:
"Courts in many jurisdictions, including Colorado, have held that,
under circumstances such as we have here, it is proper for the court
sua sponte or on motion of a' 57person not aggrieved to pass on the
constitutionality of a statute.
Once having determine that it could reach the constitutional
question, the court held that the exclusionary provision was violative of the state and federal constitutions:
The exemption provision . . . is a flagrant violation of
Article 5, Section 25 of the Constitution of the State of Colorado in that it is special legislation; and that it fails to provide for all persons "the equal protection of the laws"
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.58
As reason for this holding, the court stated that the attempted
classifications are discriminatory. It quotes 12 Am. Jur. Constitutional Law § 481 to the effect that "a classification to be valid must
rest upon material differences between the persons included in it
and those excluded."59 The quoted material in the original text
refers only to the federal constitution.
Although it is not completely clear, this appears to be a statement that the prohibition of article V, section 25, includes the prohibition of the Fourteenth Amendment against denial of equal protection of the laws, so that any violation of the latter would also
be a violation of the former. This implication has not been made so
clearly before but is not inconsistent with prior Colorado cases.60
Except for the exclusionary clause, the statute was held to be
valid. The court determined that the statute was severable and that
exclusion of the clause did not prevent the remainder from standing alone.
In a companion case, 61 the court found an exclusionary provi57 380 P.2d at 653. It should be noted that four of the six cases from other jurisdictions cited in
support of this statement are at best of doubtful precedential value. Two Tennessee cases,
Algee v. State, 200 Tenn. 127, 290 S.W.2d 869 (1956), and Remine v. Knox County, 182 Tenn. 680,
189 S.W.2d 811 (1945), seem to indicate that the chancellor in Tennessee may consider the constitutionality of a statute on his own motion in any circumstance. Even if this inference is incorrect,
the question of the constitutionality of the statute was raised by the pleadings in both of these cases.
In State ex rel. McMonigle v. Spears, 358 Mo. 23, 213 S.W.2d 210 (1948), the issue before the
court was one of res judicata. No constitutional question was under consideration. The court's
statement that constitutional questions could be decided ex mero motu where matters of public
concern are involved, must be considered mere obiter dictum.
In United Textile Works of America v. Lister Worsted Co., 91 R.I. 15, 160 A.2d 358 (1960), the
Supreme Court of Rhode Island did not consider the constitutionality of a statute, and expressly
declined to consider whether the trial judge had erred in doing so. It did indicate that there
were situations in which the court might use its own initiative to consider a statute's constitutionality, but gave no clue as to what they were. The decision was made on other grounds.
Since it is clear that the statement of the court is in accord with prior cases in Colorado, City
of Golden v. Schaul, 105 Colo. 158, 95 P.2d 806 (1939), it is not felt necessary to further pursue the
actual status of the law in other jurisdictions.
58 380 P.2d at 565.
59 Id. at 566.
60 See, e.g., McCarty v. Goldstein, 376 P.2d 691 (Colo. 1962); Vogts v. Guerrette, 142 Colo. 527,
351 P.2d 851 (1960); People ex rel. Dunbar v. People ex rel. City & County of Denver, 141 Colo. 459,
349 P.2d 142 (1960); Board of Trustees v. People ex rel. Behrman, 119 Colo. 301, 203 P.2d 490 (1949);
Allen v.Bailey, 91 Colo. 260, 14 P.2d 1087 (1932); Rifle Potato Growers Co-op. Ass'n v. Smith, 78
Colo. 171, 240 Pac. 937 (1925); Consumers' League of Colorado v. Colorado & S. Ry., 53 Colo. 54,
125 Pac. 577 (1912); People ex rel. Johnson v. Earl, 42 Colo. 238, 94 Pac. 294 (1908).
61 Colorado Interstate Gas Co. v. Sable Water Dist., 380 P.2d 569 (1963).

1964

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

sion in a statute establishing water and sanitation districts 62 void
for similar reasons.
B. Stare Decisis
In People v. Quimby 63 the court was called upon to interpret
state constitutional provisions to decide which of two appointees
should hold office as Garfield County Commissioner. The incumbent
commissioner died in office after his re-election, but prior to the
commencement of the new term. Governor McNichols appointed
Quimby ".... to hold office as by statute provided, to-wit: until the
next general election and until his successor elected thereat shall
have been duly qualified ..
-64 At the expiration of the commissioner's term of office, Governor Love, who had succeeded Governor
McNichols, appointed Diemoz to the office. Diemoz took the oath
and otherwise qualified but was refused recognition by Quimby.
The court held that, despite the apparently clear language of
article IV, section 9, of the Colorado Constitution 5 and of C.R.S.
'53 § 35-3-9,66 the appointee holds the office until the next general
election only if no new term commences in the interim. If a new
term does so commence, he holds only-until an appointee for the
new term is named and qualified. Under this rule, Diemoz was
adjudged the rightful holder of the office.
The court indicated that had the case been one of first impression, the decision might have gone the other way. It felt compelled,
however, to follow the precedent set by two prior cases 67 which held
that the language of article XII, section 10, of the Colorado Constitution" was controlling. The office is vacant whenever the person
neglects to qualify for it, even if the reason is death, and regardless
of the existence of any incumbent.
While recognizing that the ruling that the office is vacated is
a minority view, Mr. Justice Day said:
The doctrine of "stare decisis" should be adhered to in
the absence of sound reason for rejecting it. If a decision
is palpably wrong or great social changes have been
wrought so as to make the prior decision repugnant to
rather than in aid of the constitution, a court may be justified in overruling prior interpretation of the constitution.
69
No such compelling reasons present themselves here.
The lone dissenter, Mr. Justice Frantz, found the decision of
the court to be the equivalent of a judicial "amendment" to the
constitution, since the rule it applied in deciding the case was not
in accord with the plain meaning of the words of the constitution.
He argued that the true principle which should control the court's
62 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 89-5-4 (1953).
63 381 P.2d 275 (Colo. 1963).
64 The appointment is quoted Id. at 276.
65 "In case of a vacancy occurring in the office of county commissioners, the governor shall
fill the same by appointment; . . . and the person appointed shall hold the office until the next
general election, or until the vacancy be filled by election according to law."
66 "In case of a vacancy occurring in the office of county commissioner, the governor shall fill
the same by appointment of a person . . . The person appointed shall hold the office until the next
general election or until the vacancy be filled by election according to law, and until his successor
shall be qualified."
67 Gibbs v. People, 66 Colo. 414, 182 Pac. 894 (1919); People ex rel. Callaway v. De Guelle,
47 Colo. 13, 105 Pac. 1110 (1909).
68 "If any person elected or appointed shall refuse or neglect to qualify therein within the
time prescribed by law, such office shall be deemed vacant."
69 381 P.2d at 277.
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interpretation of the constitution was not stare decisis, a common
law doctrine, but the limitation expressed in the constitution itself,
in article II, section 2-that the power to alter or abolish the constitution is vested solely in the people. He approved the following
language:
The only power which the Supreme Court has to interfere with the sovereign will of the people, is when there is a
violation of the federal compact. If the constitution makers
had used doubtful or uncertain language, it is the province
of this court to say what it [sic] really meant by such
doubtful or uncertain language, but it is neither the duty
nor province of this court to substitute any other language
for that used by the constitution makers, nor to place any
forced construction upon such language, nor to eliminate
70
any language from the organic law of the people.
III.

DECISIONS OF INCIDENTAL INTEREST

Because of a difference of opinion between El Paso County
Commissioners and the judges of the Fourth Judicial District, the
Supreme Court of Colorado was called upon to decide whether the
judicial or the legislative branch was vested with ultimate authority
to fix salaries of certain court employees. In upholding the lower
court decision in Smith v. Miller 7' in favor of the judiciary, the
court interpreted the controlling legislative
enactment 2 in the light
7 3
constitution.
state
the
of
III
of article
In its opinion, the court virtually adopted the conclusion of the
trial court:
It is an ingrained principle in our government that the
three departments of government are coordinate and shall
co-operate with and complement, and at the same time act
as checks and balances against one another but shall not
interfere with or encroach on the authority or within the
province of the other .... It is abhorrent to the principles
of our legal system and to our form of government that
courts, being a coordinate department of government,
should be compelled to depend upon the vagaries of an extrinsic will. Such would interfere with the operation of the
courts, impinge upon their
power and thwart the effective
74
administration of justice.
The court held that the duty of the commissioner was a ministerial one rather than a discretionary one except where the amounts
are so unreasonable as to indicate that the judges acted arbitrarily
and capriciously.
70 381 P.2d at 282, quoting from People ex rel. Attorney Gen. v. Curtice, 50 Colo. 503,
522, 117 Pac. 357, 363 (1905). Emphasis added by Mr. Justice Frantz.
71 384 P.2d 738 (Colo. 1963).
72 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 39-16-1 (1953). The statute reads, in pertinent part: "The judge or
judges of the district court of each judical district shall appoint one or more probation officers
who shall not be dismissed without good cause shown. The judge or judges shall fix the salary
of such officers commensurate with the time required to discharge the duties hereunder, subject
to the approval of the county commissioners of the counties of such judicial district."
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 56-3-8 (1953) contains a similar provision regarding clerks.
73 "The powers of the government of this state are divided into three distinct departments the legislative, executive, and judicial; and no person or collection of persons charged with the
exercise of powers properly belonging to one of these departments shall exercise any power
properly belonging to either of the others, except as in this constitution expressly directed or
permitted."
74 384 P.2d at 741.
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ONE YEAR REVIEW OF CONTRACTS
By
I.

JOHN L.

THORNDAL*

OFFER AND ACCEPTANCE

Kinney v. Hardeman1 was a case of first impression in Colorado.
The plaintiff contended that the defendant was required to accept
his low bid for certain construction work. The defendant requested
bids on certain work but did neither specifically seek bids from
the plaintiff nor did he make any representations to the plaintiff
as to how he would determine the successful bidder. The defendant
was granted summary judgment which was affirmed on writ of
error.
[I] t is obvious that, at best, it was merely an invitation
to bid and not an operative offer. Plaintiff's bid itself
constituted the offer and it would take defendant's acceptance to complete a contract.
Mere notification or knowledge that one's bid is low
cannot of itself create a contract between the parties....2
[A]n owner is under no obligation to accept any bid..
This is true even though the defendant did not reserve a right
to reject bids. The court recognized that express terms in the call
for bids might alter the rule.
No reference to any previous Colorado cases was made by the
court nor did the author find one directly in point. Colorado precedent applicable to acceptance or rejection of bids can be found
only in cases which concern municipal corporations having ordinances providing that all public improvement contracts shall be
let to the lowest bidder.3 A contract is not formed until
it is ac4
cepted, and the municipality need not accept any bids.
Williston, 5 Corbin, 6 and the majority of states are in accord with
the rule adopted by the Supreme Court of Colorado.
11.

NOVATION

In Reilly v. Cook, McKay and Co., 7 the plaintiff was an assignee
of claims against the defendant Reilly. The claims were based on
professional services rendered for Reilly by the plaintiff's assignors
- two attorneys. The findings of the trial court resulted in a
judgment in favor of the plaintiff for the full sum requested, plus
interest. The supreme court affirmed.
The evidence was sufficient for the trial court to determine
that Reilly and his attorneys agreed to a fee of 3,000 dollars, of
which 2,750 dollars had been paid. There was also sufficient evidence to support the conclusion that there was an agreement, which
was an integral part of the contract, for the payment of a bonus
* Junior Student, University of Denver College of Law.
1 379 P.2d 628 (Colo. 1963).
2 Id. at 631.
3 Colorado Central Power Co. v. Municipal Power Dev.
Colorado Springs v. Coray, 25 Colo. App. 640, 139 Pac. 1031
Colo. 94, 80 Pac. 114 (1904).
4 1 Williston, Contracts § 31 (1936).
5 Ibid.
6 1 Corbin, Contracts § 24 (1963).
7 381 P.2d 261 (Colo. 1963).

Co., 1 F. Supp. 961 (1932); City of
(1914); City of Denver v. Dumars, 33
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of 2,500 dollars in the event Reilly was successful on appeal. The
appeal was successful, but Reilly failed to pay. Subsequently, a
friend of Reilly's, Floyd Rathbun, executed a document, the intent
of which was to guarantee the ultimate payment of the 2,500 dollars.
The defendants contended that the guarantee by Rathbun was
in fact a novation. The court held that the guarantee did not constitute a novation in view of the lack of an agreement between
all parties for its substitution in place of the original agreement.
"'There can be no novation and substitution in law unless the
original debtor, the original creditor, and the new debtor have all
entered into such agreement.' " The holding of this case reaffirms
prior Colorado decisions 9 and follows the rule of the majority of
jurisdictions.10
III.

INTERPRETATION OF CONTRACT

Hunt v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co." presents an interesting situation
raising a question of the law of contracts with regard to an interpretation of a workmen's compensation insurance policy.
The plaintiff was injured in an industrial accident while
employed by Helmbold & Son, Inc. The policy was ordered by
Helmbold between 10 A.M. and 11 A.M. on June 20 and was issued
effective 12: 01 A.M., June 20. The accident in question occurred
about 9:45 A.M., June 20, but Helmbold did not inform the insurer
of this when he applied for the policy.
[P] arties may . .. enter contracts of insurance to protect against a loss that, unknown to the parties, has already
occurred, . . . the knowledge and concealment of such
loss by the12 insured operates as a bar to recovery under
the policy.
Ordinarily Hunt would be a third party beneficiary since the
policy was made by the employer for the benefit of the employee.
The facts of the case established that a contract of insurance was
never is existence, and, therefore, third party beneficiary doctrine
could not be applied.
The doctrines of promissory estoppel or equitable estoppel were
not applicable since the facts did not show that Hunt was misled
into believing there was insurance in force. If misled, it was by
12
his employer; and there would be no estoppel against the insurer.
IV.

FRAUD, RESCISSION, AND LIABILITY OF AGENT FOR DAMAGES

In Meredith v. Ramsdell, 14 Meredith originally sued both Ramsdell and All State Oil Corporation. His complaint against All State
called for rescission of two instruments which composed a contract.
The trial court found that All State had breached the contract and
that Meredith was entitled to a decree of rescission. Meredith's
complaint against Ramsdell alleged fraud in the sale to him of the
8 Id. at 264. (Emphasis was added by the court.)
9 Temple v. Teller Lumber Co., 46 Colo. 497, 106 Pac. 8 (1909); Richardson Drug Co. v. Dunagan,
8 Colo. App. 308, 46 Pac. 227 (1896); Woodruff v. Hensel, 5 Colo. App. 103, 37 Pac. 948 (1894);
Charles v. Amos, 10 Colo. 272, 15 Pac. 417 (1887).
106 Corbin, Contracts § 1297 (1962).
11 387 P.2d 405 (Colo. 1963).
12 Id. at 406.
13 Accord, Matlock v. Hollis, 153 Kan. 227, 109 P.2d 119 (1941); Century Indem. Co. v. Jameson,
333 Mass. 503, 131 N.E.2d 767 (1956).
14 384 P.2d 941 (Colo. 1963).
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two instruments while Ramsdell acted as president of All State.
Meredith sought 3,500 dollars from All State as restitution or as
damages against Ramsdell. The trial court held against Meredith
on his complaint against Ramsdell. This was the only matter on
writ of error.
The supreme court first found that the two instruments which
were executed simultaneously constituted a contract. "[A] n agreement may be evidenced by several writings, which, when connected, show the parties, subject matter, terms, and consideration.' u5
Since there was but one contract, though comprised of two
instruments, fraud in one instrument would infect the entire transaction. The court found that fraud did exist because All State
never had an interest in the property sold in the second instrument and never
had the quantity of interest claimed in the first
16
instrument.
The primary question on appeal was whether Meredith could
have judgment for damages against Ramsdell as All State's agent
when, in the same action, he obtained a decree of rescission against
All State. The general rule is that there can be but one satisfaction
for an injury. 17 Meredith's problem was that All State was out
of business and had no assets.
The relief granted against All State was equitable, and equity
does not do justice by halves."' The rules of equity are applied to
conditions as they existed at the close of the litigation. Thus a
court of equity could determine the liability of Ramsdell when it
became obvious that a decree of rescission against All State would
not be adequate.
There is no question regarding the plaintiff's right to rescind
the contract; the principal (All State) should not be allowed to
benefit from the fraud to which it was a party. 19 The weight of
authority supports the view that the rescinding party has a right
to recover damages in case of fraud. This is not inconsistent with
the doctrine of rescission. 20 Meredith's problem, however, was one
of collecting damages from the agent because the principal was
unable to pay; to deny compensation would certainly be inequitable. 21 The court held:
[A] defrauded party may proceed against the principal
and the agent, seeking rescission against the principal and
damages against the agent who procured the execution of
15 Id. at 944.
16 On establishing fraud, the court followed 0. K. Uranium Dev. Co. v. Miller, 140 Colo. 490,
345 P.2d 382 (1959). In this case Miller was induced by an officer of 0. K. Uranium and another to
purchase stock in the company. They represented to Miller that the company had sufficient funds
to operate for six months, that it was in good financial condition, and that the company had
valuable uranium property. Later Miller discovered that the company had no property, the only
interests were options held in the name of one of the corporate officers, and the only cash available was that which Miller had invested. The court at page 492 said, "that the evidence, . . . was
sufficient to justify a finding of false representation as an inducement to the plaintiff to purchase
the corporate stock in question and to support a judgment of rescission based thereon."
17 Spaulding Mfg. Co. v. Board of Com'rs, 63 Colo. 438, 168 Pac. 34 (1917); German Nat'l Bank
v. J. D. Best & Co., 32 Colo. 192, 75 Pac. 398 (1904). The doctrine of election of remedies applies
only in those cases where the remedies sought are inconsistent with each other.
18 Doherty & Co. v. Steele, 71 Colo. 33, 204 Pac. 77 (1922).
19 Restatement (Second), Agency § 259 (1958). "A transaction into which one is induced to enter
by reliance upon untrue and material representations as to subject matter, made by [on] agent
entrusted with its preliminary or final negotiations, is subject to rescission at the election of the
person deceived."
2024 Am. Jur. Fraud & Deceit § 211 (1939).
21 Restatement (Second), Agency § 348 (1958). "An agent who fraudulently makes representations. . . . or knowingly assists in the commission of tortious fraud . . . by his principal . . . is
subject to liability in tort to the injured person although the fraud . . . occurs in a transaction on
behalf of the principal."
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the contract. Such defrauded party can have one satisfaction, and failing to obtain restitution either wholly or
partly from the principal, may recover from the agent
22 such
sum as will constitute restoration to status quo.
This decision follows a body of law which holds that the plaintiff's rescission as a result of fraud does not destroy his right to
recover damages from a third party as long as he has failed to obtain
satisfaction for
his injury, either by restoration or recovery of the
23
consideration.
It appears that this result follows where both causes of action
are united in the same complaint. Separate actions cannot be maintained at the same time since the plaintiff would have no claim
against the agent if successful against the principal; he would
receive all that he had paid. The plaintiff would have a claim
against the agent
only if he failed to obtain full satisfaction from
24
the principal.
The interesting aspect of this case is that the court is looking
beyond the corporation to its president and holding him personally
liable for fraud when the corporation is unable to pay. It will be
interesting to see how this case will affect future corporate contractual relations.
V.

COMPROMISE

AND

SETTLEMENT

25

Cummings sought specific performance or damages against
Walter and Edna Goltl alleging that the Goltls breached their obligation to sell real estate regarding which the plaintiff had an exclusive option to purchase. During the trial the parties advised the
court that both parties had conferred upon this matter and they
then read into the record a stipulation for settlement of the case.
The trial was halted and the parties given 30 days to perform their
obligations under the agreement.
Within 30 days Cummings advised the court that the defendants
had refused to abide by the stipulation. The court entered judgment
in conformity with the terms of the stipulation, thereby compelling the Goltls to abide by their agreement. The Goltls contended
the court should proceed with the trial of the matter because the
stipulation was not enforceable, that the trial was merely postponed
and would be resumed if an agreement could not be reached.
The supreme court affirmed the judgment, quoting from Hansen v. Ryan 26 which presented an analogous situation:
Where the parties have voluntarily entered into a
stipulation, which appears fair and reasonable for the
compromise and settlement of the issues of a pending cause,
and where the stipulation is spread upon the record with
the consent and approval of the court, . . . the parties are
bound thereby and the court may, thereafter, properly
22 384 P.2d at 946.
23 The court found sufficient authority for its reasoning, but it relied primarily on J. C. Turner
Lumber Co. v. Lacey, 201 App. Div. 41, 193 N.Y.S. 656 (1922). The Supreme Court of Colorado said,
however, that no action at low could be maintained for damages until the fact that the plaintiff
had suffered damage had been determined in an equity suit.
24 3 C.J.S. Agency §§ 221(b), 288, 303(b)(2) (1936).
25 Goltl v. Cummings. 380 P.2d 556 (Colo. 1963).
26 186 S.W.2d (Mo. 1945).
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proceed to dispose of the case on the2 7basis of the pleadings,
the stipulations and admitted facts.
Defendants argued that the trial court's statement "if the terms
and conditions of the stipulation are not complied with we may
resume the trial of the case at the point where we left off" meant
that the original trial would be resumed if the defendants refused
to comply with the agreement. But the court felt that when the
statement was viewed in context it merely indicated that the trial
could continue if the terms of the stipulation could not be met,
even though all parties attempted to do so. The facts of the case
indicate that there was an agreement and that only the defendants
had changed their minds.
The court made reference to Karpinski v Karpinski28 regarding
the duty of the court. "It would make for mockery in the administration of justice in this court and breed contempt for its power
if a party were permitted to evade responsibility
assumed before
' 29
the bench after days in litigation and trial.
On petition for rehearing by defendants, the court remanded
to the trial court with directions to modify its order and judgment
so as to conform to all the terms of the stipulation, some of which
had been omitted from the trial court decree.
Colorado has no previous cases in point, but there are cases
within the general field of compromise and settlement.30 A compromise is an agreement settling an existing claim in dispute or doubt
by substituted performance and can be classified under the heading of accord
and satisfaction since a compromise is always an
81
accord.
VI.

BROKER'S COMMISSION CLAIM

The plaintiff in Cary v. Borden Co. 32 alleged that he rendered
services in searching for a dairy which the defendant could purchase and thereby became entitled to a 5% commission which was
to be added to the gross selling price. His second claim was for
recovery of the reasonable value of his services as a finder or
business broker. Both claims were against the purchaser, the
Borden Company, and the seller, Carlson-Frink Company. The
defendant purchased the dairy, and the plaintiff claimed that
the transaction which he promoted, i.e., finding a dairy in Denver
for Borden, was thereby consummated. The defendants filed motions to dismiss. The trial court dismissed the claim since it involved
real estate, and Cary did not have a real estate broker's license
33
as required by statute.
The supreme court held the complaint stated claims which
were sufficient as against a motion to dismiss and reversed the
ruling of the trial court. In so holding, the court adopted the New
27 380 P.2d at 559.
28 130 N.Y.S.2d 364 (1954).
29 380 P.2d at 560.
30 West v. Wageforth, 79 Colo. 444, 246 Pac. 204 (1926); Hamill v. Copeland, 26 Colo. 178, 56
Pac. 901 (1899); Russell v. Daniels, 5 Colo. App. 224, 37 Pac. 726 (1894); Leichsenring v. Allen, 12
Colo. 168, 20 Pac. 332 (1888).
31 6 Corbin, Contracts § 1278 (1962).
32 386 P.2d 585 (Colo. 1963).
33 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 117-1-1 (1953). "It shall be unlawful for any person. . . . to engage in
the business or capacity of real estate broker or real estate salesman in this state without first
having obtained a license .... .
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York rule3 4 which permits one who without a real estate broker's
license aids in the transfer of a going business to recover a commission even though real estate forms an incident of the transaction.
[T] he fact that realty, if separately considered, would
fall within the descriptive words of the statute, cannot
justify the isolation of it for the purpose of treating it as
the subject of a separate sale; the realty must be regarded
as constituting an essential part of an exceptional and
unitary subject-matter of sale- the sale of a going concern
in which the realty involved was "not a dominant feature."35
The New Jersey rule,3 6 discussed and rejected by the court,
treats a contract in its entirety; if one part is void, the entire contract is void. In Carter v. Thompkins 37 the court approved the
theory that the legal activity is severable from the illegal. The
present court went a step further and expressly applied the New
York rule.
VII.

CONTRACT FOR SALE OF LAND

38

Hokr
sought 5,000 dollars liquidated damages from defendants for failure to complete a sale of real estate. 39 In the same
suit Marlatt, a real estate broker, claimed a commission for procuring a purchaser (Hokr) who was ready, able, and willing to buy
the real estate which as of record was owned by the three defendants. According to the defendants Thomas and Anita Price,
they had by an unrecorded deed acquired the interests other than
the mineral interest and the interest in the producing oil well
of the third defendant Mary Price. They alleged that Marlatt had
breached his agreement with them when he acquired the signature
of Mary Price through fraud and trickery. The alleged reason for
this agreement between Thomas and Anita Price and Marlatt for
not having Mary Price affix her signature to the deed was so
that she could retain her mineral interests which they thought
she should keep. It was further alleged by the defendants that
their signatures were also obtained by fraud and false representations.
The lower court held that Marlatt had breached his fiduciary
relationship with the defendants and also that Hokr had no recourse against the defendants.
The supreme court reversed on both points holding that there
had been no breach of fiduciary duty on the part of Marlatt
and that Hokr did have a perfectly valid contract and was entitled
to judgment for the amount agreed to as liquidated damages.
The court, without citing any case or secondary source in
point, held that the evidence supported a finding of fact that
Marlatt had not breached his fiduciary duty in securing the signatures of the three defendants. Based on the fact that all three
defendants willingly and without any fraudulent inducement signed
34Weingast v. Rialto Pastry Shop, 243 N.Y. 113, 152 N.E. 693 (1926).
35 386 P.2d at 587.
36 Kenney v. Paterson Milk & Cream Co., 110 N.J.L. 141, 164 AtI. 274 (1933).
37 133 Colo. 279, 294 P.2d 265 (1956).
38 Hokr v. Price, 385 P.2d 664 (Colo. 1963).
39 The contract for the sale of the real estate between Holar and the defendants reserved
half of all the mineral interests in the sellers.
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the contract for the sale of the real estate, there was a valid contract on which Hokr could recover damages for a breach thereof.
The court further stated that if Thomas and Anita Price sincerely desired that May Price have the remaining one-half interest
of the mineral rights, they could convey to her their part of the
interest reserved by them in the contract of sale.
VIII.

IMPLIED WARRANTY AS APPLIED TO REAL ESTATE CONTRACTS

Plaintiffs purchased from defendant Glisan 40 a home which was
still under construction at the closing date of the transaction. The
deed provided "house to be completed in workmanlike manner."
Shortly after the plaintiffs took possession and moved into the
house in question, cracks started appearing in surfaces of the house.
Within a short period of time the cracks had enlarged and the
doors and windows had tilted. Plaintiffs brought an action for
damages alleging (1) breach of implied warranty of fitness for
habitation, (2) tortious failures of Glisan, and (3) fraudulent concealment. The trial court awarded the plaintiff the actual damages
and 750 dollars exemplary damages.
The supreme court reversed the judgment allowing exemplary
damages and remanded with directions to the trial court to vacate
that part of the judgment. Exemplary damages were not allowed
because the record showed the defendant was not guilty of
fraudulent concealment of the soil conditions which caused the
damage; the condition was known to both buyer and seller. The
plaintiff testified that before the agreement was effectuated he
discussed the soil condition with Glisan.
The court then applied the rule:
[T1here is an implied warranty where the contract
relates to a house which is still in the process of construction, where the vendor's workmen are still on the job, and
particularly where completion is not accomplished until the
house has arrived at the contemplated
condition-namely,
41
finished and fit for habitation.
There are no prior Colorado cases on this point,
but the court
42
found sufficient support from other jurisdictions.
Damages for breach of warranty are usually the difference
between actual value and the value as warranted. The court felt
the better rule in this case would be to allow the buyer the amount
he reasonably expended to bring the property into conformity with
the warranty.
The case came up for rehearing on December 16, 1963, 43 and
rehearing was denied. The holding was slightly modified, however.
A phrase which stated "the vendor of a completed house does not,
in the absence of some express bargain, undertake any obligation
with regard to the condition of such house," was deleted (emphasis
40 Glisan v. Smolenske, 385 P.2d 659 (Colo. 1963). The case appeared in the Pacific Reporter
Second advance sheets but before the bound volume of 385 Pacific Reporter Second Series was
released the case was withdrawn by Order of the Court. A somewhat modified version of the same
case appears in 387 P.2d 260 (1963).
41 385 P.2d at 663.
42 17a C.J.S. Contracts § 329 (1963). "[A]nd in building ...
contracts . . . it is implied that
the building shall be erected and the work shall be done in a reasonably good and workmanlike
manner and when completed the structure shall be reasonably fit for the intended purpose."
43 Glisan v. Smolenske, 387 P.2d 260 (Colo. 1963).
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added). Other than this deletion, and a few minor changes due to
the deletion the case was printed exactly as on its first appeal.
Evidently the reason for this deletion was to allow for extention of the rule. This was accomplished on January 20, 1964, in
Carpenter v. Donohoe44 in another opinion written by Justice
Frantz. The court in Carpenter felt that the same rule should apply
to the purchaser of a completed house as to the purchaser of a
house which is nearing completion. Thus the implied warranty
doctrine that the house was built in workmanlike manner and is
suitable for habitation was extended to include agreements for
newly constructed buildings completed at the time of contracting.
The court did not cite any case as support for this extension
of the rule. Evidently only one judge has ever attempted to extend
the implied warranty doctrine this far; he failed for a majority
of the court in the case adopted the rule of caveat emptor.4 5 The
only authority the Colorado court could find was one law review
article 46 which is quite thorough in its treatment of real estate
warranties, both expressed and implied. This article does not lend
much support to extension of the doctrine and admits that even
the Miller case 47 is based on doubtful rationale. The article suggests
that the only way to develop a solution fair to both parties will be
through the legislature. The author's proposed legislation is not
so broad as the rule applied by the Supreme Court of Colorado; he
would apply the implied warranty to completed buildings only
where the vendor had actual knowledge of the defects at the time
it was sold. Thus the Colorado court has extended a questionable
doctrine with only the apparent support of a law review articleand that article is not really in point.
44 388 P.2d 399 (Colo. 1964).
45 Levy v. Young Constr. Co., 46 N.J. Super. 293, 134 A.2d 717 (1957).
46 14 Vand. L. Rev. 541 (1960).
47 Miller v. Cannon Hill Estates, Ltd., 2 K.B. 113 (1930). This case seems to be the leading case
in an expanding area of the law. An analysis of the case, however, reveals that it was decided on
an express warranty and the discussion of implied warranty was merely dictum.
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ONE YEAR REVIEW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS
By
I.

ALLAN SHAW

ALIMONY AND

SUPPORT PAYMENTS

In McMichael v. McMichael,1 the wife obtained a divorce and
permanent alimony of 10,000 dollars in monthly installments of 125
dollars, as well as attorney's fees. The husband paid the attorney's
fees without objection but appealed to the supreme court by writ
of error seeking reversal of the order for the payment of permanent
alimony. He contended that the trial court had abused its discretion
in ordering the payment of alimony, and that the payment was not
really alimony but rather a property settlement. His argument was
based on the fact that no provision was made for its termination
on the death or remarriage of the wife, or his own death. The
supreme court rejected the husband's contention that the award
was a property settlement rather than alimony, stating that the
conditions which might require a modification or termination of
payments could be dealt with when they occurred. The court then
held the award of alimony was proper and stated: "We have repeatedly held that the amount of alimony to be awarded is a matter
within the sound discretion of the trial court and'2 will not be
disturbed if there is credible evidence to support it."
The financial history of the marriage showed that at the time
of the marriage the wife had assets of between 80,000 and 150,000
dollars and that the husband had no assets. However, at the time
of the divorce neither the wife nor the husband had any appreciable
assets. On these facts the court found ample credible evidence to
support the lower court's judgment.
Liggett v. Liggett3 is another case in which the discretion of
the trial court was questioned. In this case the wife, from whom
the husband had been granted a divorce because of her excessive
use of alcohol and drugs, brought a writ of error contending that
she was entitled to a property settlement which had been denied
her, and that the 7,500 dollars alimony awarded her was not reasonable. The supreme court held that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion; according to the evidence, the wife had failed to perform
her duties as a wife and partner in the marriage relationship and
had not contributed to the business or financial resources of the
parties. There was no evidence that the award of alimony was
unreasonable, and the supreme court declined to interfere with the
trial court's decision in this case.
The trial court's discretion in awarding separate maintenance
rather than alimony in Hayutin v. Hayutin4 was upheld by the
supreme court on the same reasoning as applied in alimony cases.
Quoting from a Colorado decision, 5 the court said:
It is fundamental that the question of the amount of
alimony awarded rests in the sound discretion of the trial
Junior Student, University of Denver College of Low.
1 380 P.2d 233 (Colo. 1963).
2 Id. at 234.
3 380 P.2d 673 (Colo. 1963).
4 381 P.2d 272 (Colo. 1963).
5 McPheeters v. McPheeters, 132 Colo. 312, 287 P.2d 959 (1955).
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judge if supported by competent evidence. Kleiger v.
Kleiger, 127 Colo. 86, 254 P.2d 426. The award when made
will not be disturbed or modified by this court in the
absence of a showing of abuse of discretion on the part of
the trial judge. A careful consideration of the record here
presented fails to show an abuse of discretion.6
The Hayutin case had an interesting twist in that the husband,
after less than three months of marriage, instituted annulment
proceedings in Nevada where the marriage had taken place. The
wife subsequently brought an action in Colorado for separate
maintenance. Since a final determination had not been reached by
the Nevada court, the trial court ordered the husband to refrain
from proceeding with the Nevada action. The supreme court, in
sustaining the order of the trial court, stated that the general rule
is ". . . well established that courts of equity will and should in
proper cases enjoin a party to a divorce or separate maintenance
action from
proceeding in an annulment suit in a foreign juris7
diction."
Alexander v. District Court" was a divorce action in which the
husband was granted the decree and the wife awarded alimony.
Subsequently, the trial court without notice to the wife or her
attorney vacated the award of alimony; and the wife, in an original
mandamus proceeding, sought to have the award reinstated. The
respondent judge stated that he had vacated the alimony award
after reconsideration of the case because he felt that the award
was not supported by the evidence. The supreme court reinstated
the award holding that the trial court, which had jurisdiction over
the parties originally, was without jurisdiction or authority to
vacate an award of alimony after its entry without notice to the
parties even though the court concluded that it had committed
error in the original awarding of alimony.
II.

ALTERATION OF SUPPORT PAYMENTS

Three 1963 Colorado cases considered the propriety of altering
support payments after a divorce had been granted and the conditions upon which the support payments were based had changed.
The first case, Griffith v. Griffith,9 was a proceeding on a motion
to vacate a judgment for unpaid monthly child support payments.
The husband had been granted the divorce, there had been a
property settlement, and the husband had been ordered to pay
75 dollars monthly for support of a child whose custody was
awarded to the mother. The mother subsequently secreted herself
and the child, remarried, and had her second husband tell the
first that they did not want his money. Being unable to make
further support payments, the father let them lapse and the mother
brought suit when he became 5,400 dollars in arrearage. Upon a
hearing, the mother agreed to a reduction to 2,500 dollars, but the
trial court awarded her only 1,000 dollars, and she brought a writ
of error claiming that the trial court was without power to cancel
the payments which were due. The supreme court agreed that
6
7
8
9

381
Id.
387
381

P.2d at 275.
at 273.
P.2d 726 (Colo. 1963).
P.2d 455 (Colo. 1963).
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under the general rule an order reducing the amount of support
money operates only in futuro,10 but held that when the mother's
admissions and actions showed that equity required a reduction of
past-due payments, the mother could not object because the reduction given by the trial court was not to her liking. The trial court
had found that a lesser sum than asked for by the mother would
adequately provide for the child.
The case of Garrow v. Garrow" involved a review of an order
of the district court modifying the terms of child support and
visitation rights. The district court had ordered an increase in
child support payments from 100 to 190 dollars per month, such
increase being based on the fact that the divorced husband's income
had increased from 350 dollars per month at the time of the
divorce to 500 dollars per month at the time of the hearing. The
ex-husband brought a writ of error claiming that the trial court
had abused its discretion in increasing the support payments, granting the attorney's fees, and ordering that he take the children
to church at the discretion of their mother. The court, in affirming
the decision of the lower court, quoted from the case of Brown v.
Brown 12 which clearly and explicitly states the applicable Colorado
law governing the present case:
It always has been recognized in this jurisdiction that if
the financial ability of the husband and father improves,
and the needs of the minor children increase, the jurisdiction of the court to make additional orders for the care
and maintenance of the minor children
may be invoked
13
at any time in the proper proceeding.
Looking to the facts of the case, the court found that there was
sufficient evidence to justify the order of the trial court.
In Drazich v. Drazich,14 the father petitioned for a reduction
of support payments because his daughter had finished high school
and had obtained a job. The petition was not acted upon, and the
father reduced the payments on his own initiative. Upon suit by
the mother for past payments owed by the father, the trial court
awarded them to her. The father sought relief by writ of error
on the theory that the trial court had erred in entering judgment
for the arrearage in support money in the face of his showing that
his daughter was emancipated when his petition was filed. He urged
the supreme court to direct the trial court to issue a nuc pro tunc
order to do what he contended should have been done earliernamely, order that he should no longer be required to make support payments for his emancipated daughter who was no longer
living at home. The supreme court, however, upheld the judgment
of the lower court and ordered that the past payments that were
due be paid. Citing a number of Colorado cases, the court stated
that in support matters, each installment maturing under a decree
which has not been modified becomes a judgment debt similar to
any other judgment for money, 15 and the trial court was without
10 Engleman v. Engleman, 145 Colo. 299, 358 P.2d 864 (1961).
11 382 P.2d 809 (Cola. 1963).
12 131 Colo. 467, 283 P.2d 951 (1955).
13 382 P.2d at 811.
14 385 P.2d 259 (Colo. 1963).
15 Taylor v. Taylor, 147 Colo. 140, 326 P.2d 1027 (1961); Burke v.
P.2d 740 (1953).

Burke, 127 Colo.

257, 255
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power to enter an order which would, in effect, amount to a cancellation of delinquent support payments. 6 "A modifying order or
decree relates only to future
payments and can be effective only
17
from the time of its entry.'
III.

REMOVAL

OF CHILDREN

FROM THE STATE

Two 1963 Colorado cases dealt with problems that arise when
the parent having custody of the children desires to remove them
from the state. Nelson v. Grissom18 illustrates an important factor to
be taken into consideration in the removal of custodial children
from the state. The mother, who had the custody of the two
children, had remarried and requested that she be allowed to take
the children with her to California where her present husband was
employed. The father contested the request and attempted to
introduce into evidence hospital records relating to the second
husband's emotional instability. The trial court refused to receive
this evidence and the father brought a writ of error, claiming that
is was in the best interests of the children that the facts contained
in the hospital records be known to the trial court. The supreme
court ruled that the hospital records were not privileged insofar
as this question was concerned and should have been admitted
into evidence. The issue before the trial court being whether or
not it was in the best interests of the minor children to permit
their removal, evidence of the emotional stability or instability of
the stepfather was material to the issue though he was not a party
to the litigation.
The second case, Tanttila v. Tanttila, 9 dealt more thoroughly
with the problem of removal and was one of the court's more
interesting decisions. The mother of the three minor children asked
for and was granted permission by the lower court to remove the
children to her home in Minnesota. The father brought a writ of
error to review the decision of the trial court. He contended that
removal was not in the best interests of the children, that it would
unreasonably deprive him of his visitation rights, and that it was
purely for the convenience of the mother.
16
17
IS
19

Ferkovich
385 P.2d
382 P.2d
382 P.2d

v. Ferkovich, 130 Colo. 228, 274 P.2d 602 (1954).
at 260.
991 (Colo. 1963).
798 (Colo. 1963).
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The judgment was reversed and the order authorizing the
removal vacated. Citing a Colorado decision,! ° the supreme court
reiterated its holding therein that it is contrary to Colorado law to
permit the removal of children from the jurisdiction unless their
best interests would be served; but if it is determined that removal
would be in the children's best interests, it should be allowed. The
court, quoting from a Colorado case,-' listed the factors that are to
be considered in determining what is in the best interests of the
children:
In determining what is for the best welfare of a child
of tender years, the courts must consider not only food,
clothing, shelter, care, education, and environment, but
also bear in mind that every such child is entitled to the
love, nurture, advice, and training of both father and
mother, and to deny to the child an opportunity to know,
associate with, love, and be loved by either parent, may be
a more serious ill than to refuse it in some part those things
which money can buy.22
Examining the facts in the light of the above language, the
majority of the court felt that it was in the best interests of the
children to remain in Colorado. The evidence failed to show that
the children would be in a better environment if the removal
were allowed. If more support were required for the children so
that they could stay in Colorado, the father was willing and able
to provide it. The court agreed with the father's contention that the
removal was solely for the mother's personal convenience.
IV. ADOPTION
The supreme court considered only one adoption case in 1963.
In Pelt v. Tunks,23 the defendants adopted an infant born to the
plaintiff, an nnwed mother. More than seven months after the
final decree of adoption had been entered, the plaintiff filed a
petition for revocation of the decree. No hearings were held, and a
minute order was entered which set aside the adoption decree
and gave the defendants 10 days within which to answer. On that
same day the court entered findings of fact and conclusions of law
setting aside the adoption, dispensing with a motion for a new
trial, and giving the defendants 10 days within which to file their
appeal. In other words, on the day the defendants were given
10 days to answer the petition, an order was entered making the
action of the court final. The defendants requested that the judgment be reversed and the cause remanded to the county court
with directions to set the matter for hearing on the merits; this
request was granted by the court.
V.

COMMON LAW MARRIAGE

An interesting situation was presented to the court in Ward v.
Terriere.24 The plaintiff, claiming rights as a widow, brought suit
20McGonigle v. McGonigle, 112 Colo. 569, 151 P.2d 977 (1944).
21 Searle v. Searle, 115 Colo. 266, 172 P.2d 837 (1946).
22 382 P.2d at 799.
23 385 P.2d 261 (Colo. 1963).
24 386 P.2d 352 (Colo. 1963).
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against the estate of her deceased former husband. She alleged
that although she had been granted a divorce, three and one-half
years later she had moved that the divorce decree be set aside. In
the alternative, she contended that even if the divorce decree was
valid, she and the deceased had become husband and wife by entering into a common law marriage subsequent to the divorce. The
trial court ruled against her on both contentions.
On the first of the plaintiff's contentions, the supreme court
ruled that the trial court was bound by the final decree of divorce
and was correct in its holding that the divorce could not be dismissed. The interlocutory decree granting the divorce, by force of
law, 25 became final six months from its date of entry. The plaintiff's
motion to set aside the decree was not made within the six months
limitation and thus, from the record, the supreme court found that
the county court had no jurisdiction to dismiss such a case which
had proceeded to final judgment.
On the second contention as to the common law remarriage,
the supreme court found the issue to have been correctly resolved
by the trial court that had weighed the testimony which, although
conflicting, was heavily against the plaintiff. The trial court had
found that although there was evidence of cohabitation and posing
as husband and wife between the parties, by and large, the plaintiff
had not conducted herself as though she had been bound in marriage, but had only tried to convey the impression of a marriage
relationship between herself and the deceased when it was to her
convenience or best interest.
VI.

PATERNITY AND

DEPENDENCY

In 1963 the Supreme Court of Colorado heard one paternity
and two dependency cases. In the paternity case, Beck v. Beck,26
the juvenile court considered the question of whether the husband
had access to his wife during the possible period of conception of
her child which, she alleged, was his. At the conclusion of the
trial a verdict in her favor was directed. The husband then filed
a motion for a judgment non obstante veredicto attaching thereto
a blood test taken after the trial by agreement of the parties before
trial. The blood test showed that it was impossible for the husband
to have been the father of the child. The trial court granted the
husband's motion and a writ of error was brought by the wife who
contended that blood tests were incompetent to overcome the pre27
sumption of legitimacy. The court cited the Colorado statute
which permits the court to order that blood tests be taken in
paternity proceedings and held that the statute entitles the reputed
father to have the tests made and the results introduced into
evidence when definite exclusion is established, provided a proper
foundation has been laid. When such evidence is introduced, it is
competent to overcome the presumption of legitimacy. The court
felt that to hold otherwise would be acting contrary to an established scientific fact.
25 Colo. Sess. Laws 1929, ch. 91, § 3.
26 384 P.2d 731 (Colo. 1963).
27 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 52-1-27 (Perm. Supp. 1960).

1964

DOMESTIC RELATIONS

In Martinez v. Lopez, 28 the mother brought an action in the
juvenile court under C.R.S. '53 § 22-7-1 charging the defendant with
contributing to the child's dependency. The defendant, Martinez,
denied paternity and also denied that the child was dependent
as contemplated by the statute under which the proceedings were
instituted. In a jury trial he was found to be the father of the child
and contributing to her dependency. However, no judgment was
entered on the verdict that he was contributing to the dependency
of the child. Following the denial of a motion for a new trial, the
defendant brought a writ of error. The supreme court reversed
the judgment and remanded the cause with directions to dismiss
the proceedings, stating that the statute under which the action was
brought provided expressly that the juvenile court could handle
dependency proceedings, but not paternity suits. Citing the case of
Everett v. Barry,29 the court stressed that the juvenile court is a
statutory court with no jurisdiction beyond that expressly given
by statute. Thus, the court reasoned, a paternity matter could not
be properly determined under a statute providing for dependency
proceedings. As far as the dependency matter was concerned, in
light of the complete lack of evidence showing either that the
child was dependent or the defendant was contributing toward her
dependency, the juvenile court should have directed a verdict for
the defendant. The court said, "To permit one to expand the
statutory proceedings on 'contributing to dependency' beyond the
construction guidelines in 22-7-7 would effect judicial repeal of the
and would forever remove the
provisions on 'paternity proceedings'
30
limitations therein contained.
As far as the actual question of paternity was concerned, the
paternity statute, C.R.S. '53 § 22-6-1, provides that an action must
be brought before the child is 12 months old and can be brought
by the mother only. The first of these conditions was not complied
with as the child was 4 years old at the time of the proceedings.
The plaintiff was, therefore, precluded from bringing a paternity
action under the paternity statute, and the decision of the court
prohibited her from accomplishing a decree of paternity under the
guise of a dependency suit.
In Nissen v. People,31 the mother claimed that the defendant,
the alleged father, was contributing to the dependency of the child.
In the lower court a judgment from which the father brought a
writ of error was entered against him. The supreme court reversed,
holding that the plaintiff failed to prove that the daughter was a
dependent or negligent child, and without the showing that the child
was dependent there was nothing the defendant could be contributing to.
The court cited Martinez v. Lopez 32 discussed above and stated
that it was controlling in the disposition of the present case. In
both cases evidence was introduced which established that the
mother was earning sufficient funds to support the child; and,
therefore, the child was not dependent as alleged.
28
29
30
31
32

386 P.2d 595 (Colo. 1963).
127 Colo. 34, 252 P.2d 826 (1953).
386 P.2d at 598.
387 P.2d 897 (Colo. 1963).
Supra note 28.
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ONE YEAR REVIEW OF EVIDENCE
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I.

ALAN

H.

BUCHOLTZ*

CRIMINAL CASES

In Garrison v. People' the petitioner was tried, convicted of
murder, and sentenced to death. A plea of not guilty by reason of
insanity had been entered, but a finding of sanity was returned. The
conviction and sentence were affirmed by the supreme court.2 A
few days before execution, Garrison filed a petition in the trial
court, with physician's affidavit attached, alleging that he was then
insane and had become so since the date on which judgment was
entered. Execution was stayed and a psychiatrist was appointed to
examine him. At a subsequent jury trial a finding of sanity was
entered to which Garrison filed a writ of error.
The assigned error was that the trial court excluded all evidence of the appellant's mental condition prior to January 20, 1960,
the date on which the original judgment and sentence were pronounced. Garrison's contention was that the court, relying on language in Leick v. People,3 excluded this evidence solely because it
antedated the imposition of sentence. Appellant urged that such
evidence was admissible, not to show mental condition at or before
the time of sentence, but to throw light on his true mental condition
at the time of the postsentence sanity trial. His mental illness, he
insisted, was hereditary and he sought to introduce a full family
history to show that his mental condition was " the logical culmina4
tion of a long, drawn-out process of mental deterioration.
The supreme court quoted the language from Leick that "The
sole and only issue to be determined ... was the defendant's sanity
or lack thereof occurring subsequent to conviction and sentence in
the criminal action." 5 This language, the court held, was not "tantamount to a declaration that any and all evidence of the mental
condition of the defendant prior to 'conviction and sentence in the
criminal action', however relevant it may be to his present mental
state, is inadmissible solely because it occurred prior to such date."6
In arriving at its final conclusion the court relied on an American Jurisprudence passage 7 and said:
[I] f evidence of the general type alluded to, supra, is otherwise competent, relevant and material, it is not inadmissible
solely because it occurred prior to the time judgment and
sentence entered in the criminal proceeding, or because it
relates to his mental condition prior to such time . .. .8
The opinion admitted that the Am. Jur. section presupposes an insanity plea relating to the time of the commission of the crime and
not to one interposed after sentence but said that "in logic there is
no valid reason for applying a different rule where the issue is
* Senior student, University of Denver College of Low.
1 378 P.2d 401 (Colo. 1963).
2 Garrison v. People, 147 Colo. 385, 364 P.2d 197 (1961).
3 140 Colo. 564, 345 P.2d 1054 (1959).
4 378 P.2d at 403.
5 140 Colo. at 568, 345 P.2d 1054, 1056.
6 378 P.2d at 403.
7 20 Am. Jur. Evidence § 349 (1939). See 378 P.2d at 403, 404.
8 378 P.2d at 404.
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whether a person 'has become and remains' insane since the imposition of sentence. In either event the ultimate issue is the sanity, or
lack of it, of a particular individual as of a date certain."9
It is no doubt true that the trauma of sentence and impending
execution may react on a pre-existing mental condition and cause
postsentence insanity. The propriety of the decision, therefore, cannot be argued. The court might have, however, found sounder legal
principles on which to base its opinion. Two fairly recent Pennsylvania decisions are in point. The first, Commonwealth v. Gossard,0
held that in determining the petitioner's mental condition at post9 Ibid.

10 385 Pa. 312, 123 A.2d 258 (1956).
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sentence proceedings, the evidence at the murder trial as well as the
entire life record of the petitioner may be considered. The second,
Commonwealth v. Ballem," held that the language in Gossard was
not mandatory, but consideration of the prior life record was at
least discretionary.
Stretching the Am. Jur. quotation to meet the needs of this
case is unnecessary in light of the statutory tests of insanity in
Colorado. The "right-wrong plus irresistable impulse"'12 test is used
to determine criminal insanity at the time of the commission of the
wrongful act, while the postsentence test is whether the prisoner
has "sufficient intelligence to understand the proceedings, the pur'13
pose of his punishment and the impending fate awaiting him.
Certainly, an adjudication of sanity based on the right-wrong, irresistable impulse test should not be, in effect, res judicata as to the
"intelligence" test.
The differences in the amount and burden of proof required in
the two sanity trials might provide further basis for the decision.
At the initial trial the prosecution has the burden of proving sanity
beyond a reasonable doubt 14 after the defense has raised the issue
with some evidence. At the postsentence sanity trial the petitioner
has, by statute, the burden of proving his insanity by a preponderance of the evidence.' 5 It is clear that since the burden of proof is on
the prosecution in the first instance, the full mental history of the
defendant may not, or need not, be presented at that trial by the
defense. In addition, since the postsentence sanity trial is discretionary, 16 an affidavit of a psychiatrist usually accompanies the
petition to convince the judge of the validity of the alleged insanity.
In preparing his findings the psychiatrist must utilize the individual's full life history. To allow a sanity trial based on such affidavit
and then to exclude much of the material on which it was based is
inconsistent. The foregoing discussion could, it is suggested, bulwark
the opinion of the court.
The question of what evidence is admissible at a postsentence
sanity trial is not one-sided. The opposing argument is based on the
following:
11391 Pa. 626, 139 A.2d 534 (1958).
12Colo. Rev. Stat. § 39-8-1(2) (1953). "The applicable test of insanity in such cases shall be,
and the jury shall be so instructed: 'A person who is so diseased in mind at the time of the act as
to be incapable of distinguishing right from wrong with respect to that act, or being able so to
distinguish, has suffered such an impairment of mind by disease as to destroy the will power and
render him incapable of choosing the right and refraining from doing the wrong, is not accountable; and this is true howsoever such insanity may be manifested, whether by irresistable impulse
or otherwise. But care should be taken not to confuse such mental disease with moral obliquity,
mental depravity, or passion growing out of anger, revenge, hatred or other motives, and kindred
evil conditions, for when the act is induced by any of these causes the person is accountable to
the law.' "
13 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 39-8-6(8) (1953). "...
[W]hen the issue is whether the defendant has
become insane since judgment and sentence, and the punishment is death, the following shall be
the applicable test, and the jury shall be so instructed: 'The defendant is not to be considered as
insane if he has sufficient intelligence to understand the nature of the proceeding against him, the
charge of which he was convicted, the purpose of his punishment, and the impending fate which
awaits him, and has sufficient mind to know any facts which would make his punishment unlawful
and to communicate such facts to his attorney or to the court.' "
14 Leick v. People, 136 Colo. 544, 322 P.2d 674 (1956); Martz v. People, 114 Colo. 278, 162 P.2d
408 (1945); Arridy v. People, 103 Colo. 29, 82 P.2d 757 (1938); Graham v. People, 95 Colo. 544, 38
P.2d 87 (1934); Ingles v. People, 92 Colo. 518, 22 P.2d 1109 (1933).
15 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 39-8-6(7) (1953). "The trial of the issue of sanity or insanity of the
defendant in this section shall be deemed a civil proceeding, and the jury shall consist of twelve
persons . . . . When the issue is whether the defendant has thus become and then is insane, the
burden shall be upon the defendant to prove by a preponderance of the evidence insanity at the
time and as occurring since the commission of the offense, or since the verdict of guilty, or since
the judgment, as the case may be ....
" See Leick v. People, 140 Colo. 564, 345 P.2d 1054 (1959).
16 Leick v. People, 140 Colo. 564, 345 P.2d 1054 (1959); Berger v. People, 123 Cola. 403, 231
P.2d 799 (1951); Bulger v. People, 61 Colo. 187, 156 Pac. 800 (1910).
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Sanity of an accused at the time he committed the offense
is conclusively determined by the judgment of conviction
and it cannot be again raised in a proceeding to determine
the question of his sanity before execution of a capital sentence on him. Accordingly, the only questions for trial are
whether the accused has become insane or a lunatic since
the entry of the original judgment and whether he is insane
or a lunatic at the time of the present proceeding; and since
the judgment of conviction conclusively raises a presumption of sanity at the time of the offense, the burden is on
the accused to show by a preponderance of evidence that
he has become insane
subsequent to the final judgment and
7
before execution.1
Strict interpretation of this passage and the statutory requirement
that it must be specifically pleaded that the insanity arose after the
imposition of sentence leads to the supposition that the evidence at
trial should be restricted. 18 Of the arguments, however, those favoring the liberal admission of evidence appear to be more plausible
in the light of modern psychiatric concepts.
Another 1963 case, Coppinger v. People,19 strongly reiterated
that under the Colorado Habitual Criminal Act 20 certified copies of
prior convictions are insufficient to prove such convictions. The
statute demands authenticated copies and the court will accept no
less. The opinion pointed out that what constitutes an authenticated
copy was stated explicitly in Brown v. People2 1 and that the "additional certificates of authenticity by the judge ... and ...the clerk
. ..are essential before the documents may be received under the
statute. '22 There can be no question now about the standard of proof
required, unless
the defendant admits his identity and the former
23
convictions.
The major issue on appeal in Johnson v. People24 was the denial
by the trial court of a motion to quash a robbery information under
the doctrine of autrefois acquit.25 A subsidiary element, but one of
importance to Colorado law, was the admission into evidence of the
first-trial testimony of a witness who refused to testify at the second
trial. Colorado has heretofore adopted the rule of admissibility- of
such testimony when the witness whose testimony was sought was
deceased or otherwise unavailable and the defense had had an opportunity to cross-examine the witness at the first trial. 26 But in
Johnson the witness was available.
Looking to other jurisdictions, the court adopted the rationale
of a Kansas case2 7 and held that the true test "was not so much the
17 24 C.J.S.Criminal Law § 1618 (1961).
18 See People v. Eldred, 103 Colo. 334, 86 P.2d 248 (1938). The entire Colorado law of insanity
is discussed in: Cohen, "Insanity and the Law: Toward a Rational Development of Criminal
Responsibility," 39 Dicta 325 (1962).
19 380 P.2d 19 (Colo. 1963).
20 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 39-13-2 (1953). "Evidence of former convictions. - On any trial under the
provisions of this article, a duly authenticated copy of the record of former convictions and judgments of any court of record for any of said crimes against the party indicted or informed against
shall be prima facie evidence of such convictions and may be used in evidence against such party."
21 124 Colo. 412, 238 P.2d 847 (1951).
22 380 P.2d at 20.
23 Hackett v. Tinsley, 143 Colo. 203, 352 P.2d 799 (1960).
24 384 P.2d 454 (Colo. 1963).
25 This issue is discussed in this year's "One Year Review of Constitutional Law," supra page 77.
26 Henwood v. People, 57 Colo. 544, 143 Pac. 373 (1914); Young v. People, 54 Colo. 293, 130
Pac. 1011 (1913).
27 State v. Stewart, 85 Kan. 404, 116 Pac. 489 (1911).
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'unavailability' of the witness, but the 'unavailability' of his testimony and that a witness who-though present-refused to testify is
just as surely 'unavailable' as the witness who stepped across a state
line to avoid service of a subpoena. '2 The decision on this point has
further support from case law and secondary authority.2 9 Under the
general rule the first-trial testimony is admitted when the witness
is present but claims a privilege not to testify."0 The Colorado law,
on the basis of Johnson, goes one step further and allows the use
of the testimony when the witness does not claim any privilege, but
merely refuses to testify. If it so desires, the court may limit this
decision in the future since in Johnson the witness was serving a
life sentence in the penitentiary and the trial court was "handicapped as to the possible punishment which it could impose under
its contempt powers for his refusal to testify.""1
II.

CIVIL CASES

The use of blood test results to overcome the presumption of
legitimacy was the subject of Beck v. Beck. 32 On the basis of 6 blood
test, taken after the trial pursuant to agreement made before trial,
the lower court granted judgment n.o.v., and the mother brought a
writ of error. In the opinion, the court recognized that the presumption of legitimacy is one of the strongest presumptions known to
the law and can be overcome only by proof of non-access or impotency of the husband, 33 but cited a Massachusetts case which held
that the rule does not require proof on either ground to a degree of
impossibility.3 4 The court quoted from the Colorado blood test statute 35 and gave this interpretation:
As we read the statute a reputed father is entitled as a matter of right to have such tests made; he is further entitled
to have the tests received in evidence when definite exclusion is established, provided a proper foundation is laid for
the introduction of such evidence. The words 'may be received in evidence' in
the act must have that effect if they
36
are to be meaningful.
The evidence of the tests so admitted is competent to overcome the
presumption of legitimacy. 37 This is the
general rule in jurisdictions
38
having a statute similar to Colorado's.
Nelson v. Grissom39 concerned a dispute about whether a mother
who had full custody of two minor children, subject to the father's
visitation rights, could take the children to California to live in a
'8 384 P.2d at 457.
29 People v. Picket, 339 Mich. 294, 63 N.W.2d 681 (1954). See 20 Am. Jur. Evidence §§ 686-7C6
(1939); 15 A.L.R. 495 (1921); 45 A.L.R.2d 1354 (1956).
30 See 45 A.L.R.2d 1354 (1956).
31 384 P.2d at 457.
32 384 P.2d 731 (Colo. 1963).
33 Lanford v. Lanford, 377 P.2d 115 (Colo. 1962).
34 Commonwealth v. Kitchen, 299 Mass. 7, 11 N.E.2d 482 (1937).
35 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 52-1-27 (Perm. Supp. 1960). "Blood grouping tests - costs. - In any action,
suit, or proceeding wherein the paternity of any child or children is denied, the court on the motion
of the reputed father shall order the mother, her child or children, and the reputed father to submit
to one or more blood grouping tests by a duly qualified physician or other duly qualified person
to determine whether or not the reputed father can be excluded as being the father of said child or
children, and the results of such tests may be received in evidence, but only in cases where
definite exclusion is established.
36 384 P.2d at 732.
37 Beck v. Beck, 384 P.2d 731 (Colo. 1963).
38 See 46 A.L.R.2d 1000 (1956).
39 392 P.2d 991 (Colo. 1963).
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home presided over by their stepfather. At the hearing, Nelson, the
father, attempted to introduce records and testimony of the new
husband's mental unfitness. Nelson established that Grissom, the
new husband, had threatened his own children by a prior marriage
with a loaded rifle and had on that occasion shot himself. Grissom
was already settled in California and was not present. The court
excluded the hospital records and doctor's testimony on the ground
that they were privileged.
After considering the facts, the supreme court decided that
evidence of Grissom's emotional stability, or lack of it, was material
to the issue of whether or not it was in the best interest of the
children to permit their removal to California where they would
live in Grissom's home. Nelson, it said, should have been given an
opportunity in the trial court to show that the records and testimony were not privileged and that each was otherwise competent.
"Statements made by one to a doctor are not ipso facto privileged,
but are privileged only if they meet all the several requirements
contained in C.R.S. '53, 153-1-7 (4) ."41 The case is unique in that it
is not the unfitness of the natural parent which is being questioned,
40 Id. at 993.
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but that of a stepparent with whom the children will have to live.
However, the court said in the leading case of Wilson v. Mitchell:
Thus by natural law, by common law, and likewise the statutes of this state, the natural parents are entitled to the
custody of their minor children, except when they are unsuitable persons to be entrusted with their care, control
and education, or when some exceptional circumstances
appear which render41such custody inimicable to the best
interests of the child.
The above quote, combined with the general rule that the welfare
of the child controls, 42 is sufficient to account for the decision.
Another case, Lee v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 43 reaffirmed the Colorado rule relating to the probative value of negative evidence. That
rule is:
The probative force of negative testimony depends largely
upon circumstances. In some circumstances, its probative
force may be so slight as to reach the vanishing point; in
other circumstances, such testimony may be more persuasive than the positive testimony of some witnesses. It is only
when it is so clear that such testimony has no probative
value whatever that reasonable men would not differ in
their conclusions with reference thereto, that courts are
justified in disregarding it on the
ground that it does not
44
rise to the dignity of evidence.
In Lee, the court also held that by showing a railroad investigator
could not testify coherently on deposition without refreshing his
memory from a file covering the accident, the plaintiff had demonstrated a right to have the file produced by subpoena duces tecum
under Colorado Rule 45 (b), subject to any protective orders by the
court.
The decision in Colorado Fuel & Iron Corp. v. Industrial
Com'n 45 clarified and expanded a prior holding that no medical
proof of causation was necessary in workmen's compensation cases.
The court said:
[W] e now add [to the prior decision] that if the rule were
otherwise an unattended injury or death in many cases
could never be compensated. All that is necessary to warrant the finding of a causal connection between the accident
and the disability, is to show facts and circumstances which
would indicate with reasonable probability that the injury
or death
resulted from or was precipitated by the acci46
dent.
The foregoing 1963 cases are the ones chosen as having significant impact in the law of evidence. The remaining cases, concerning such matters as judicial notice, corroboration of confessions
made extra-judicially, weight of testimony, parol evidence, admission of documents to refresh recollection, impeachment and waiver
of privilege or objection, follow well-established rules and add little
to the further development of the law.
4148 Colo. 454, 466,
42 Coulter v. Coulter,
43 381 P.2d 35 (Colo.
44 Colorado & S. Ry.
45 380 P.2d 28 (Colo.
46 Id. at 30.

111 Pac. 21, 26 (1910). (Emphasis added.)
141 Colo. 236, 347 P.2d 492 (1959).
1963).
v. Honaker, 92 Colo. 239, 248, 19 P.2d 750, 763 (1933).
1963).
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ALAN

H.

BUCHOLTZ*

Moderization and clarification of procedure dominated the 1963
habeas corpus decisions in Colorado. By far the most important of
these decisions was Stilley v. Tinsley;' the others being barely
worthy of comment.The Stilley case, brought up on writ of error, sought a reversal
of a decision by the Denver District Court which, on final hearing
of the petition for writ of habeas corpus, found that Stilley's original
sentence was void, dismissed the petition, and then proceeded to
pronounce proper sentence nunc pro tunc from the original date
of sentence.3 The supreme court held that the only question properly before the trial court was the present authority of Tinsley to
keep Stilley confined in the penitentiary. Because the original
judgment was void, the only authority to confine the petitioner was
the equally void mittimus. The conclusion stated in the opinion is
that the
trial court did not 'dispose of the prisoner as the case
may require,' but went into other matters not properly
before the court and erroneously decided the one and only
issue that was properly before it.
The trial court correctly determined that at the time
of his pronouncement, Tinsley had no authority to restrain
Stilley, and that the mittimus, Tinsley's authority, was
void. Having so decided, the trial judge had only one remaining duty to perform in the case then before him Senior Student, University of Denver College of Low.
1 385 P.2d 677 (Colo. 1963).
2 These cases held:
(a) Specht v. Tinsley, 385 P.2d 423 (Colo. 1963), outlines the three situations in which
habeas corpus is available to one committed in a criminal proceeding; these are where the
trial court (1) has no jurisdiction over the person, (2) has no jurisdiction over the subject matter
of the offense, and (3) renders a void judgment and sentence, reaffirms that the writ cannot
be substituted for a writ of error, holds that although one may be improperly confined in a
criminal case, he is not ipso facto entitled to discharge, boil or other relief, and holds that the
procedural issue of being sentenced under the wrong statute cannot be raised in a habeos corpus
proceeding. The trial court is admonished for not following proper procedure as required by
C.R.S. '53 § 65-1-1, in that the trial court issued a show cause order to Tinsley instead of forthwith
granting or denying the writ.
(b) In re Pigg's Petition, 384 P.2d 267 (Colo. 1963), granted a request to proceed in forma
pauperis to prosecute a writ of error to a judgment denying a writ of habeas corpus. The supreme
court refused to assign counsel, indicating that the trial court is the proper forum for that purpose.
Review is available if the trial court denies the appointment.
(c) In Kostal v. Tinsley, 381 P.2d 43 (Colo. 1963), the court decided that a prisoner who was
placed in solitary confinement for attempted escape and on the suspicion of the senior captain
of guards at the state penitentiary, and who during those periods was denied access to his typewriter and legal materials, had not alleged any act, omission or event which would entitle him
to a discharge on writ of habeas corpus. This was especially true since the petitioner had been
granted additional time to file his legal papers.
(d) Although the petition for writ of habeas corpus was improperly filed in the criminal
action in Buhler v. People, 377 P.2d 748 (Colo. 1963), the court reversed a dismissal of the writ
on the ground that the warrant for extradition to Illinois was void because it did not charge an
offense under the Illinois statutes. The members of the bench and bar were reminded that
habeas corpus is a civil proceeding and the writ should be filed in a separate action, naming
as respondent the person detaining the petitioner. This case is cited in Stilley supra, for this
proposition.
3 The pertinent part of the district court's order is found in 385 P.2d at 679. Stilley's petition
was filed in the trial court alleging that Tinsley, warden of the state penitentiary, was illegally
confining him as a parole violator. He claimed that he was convicted of burglary in the Denver
District Court and, on November 24, 1954, was sentenced to the penitentiary for a period of one
to ten years and that mittimus issued in conformity with the sentence. He alleged further that
at the time of sentence he was under twenty-one years of age and under C.R.S. '53 § 39-10-1
could be sentenced only to the state reformatory and that therefore his sentence to the
penitentiary and the mittimus thereunder were void, thus making his present confinement for
parole violation equally void.
*
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order Stilley
released from the custody and restraint of
4
Tinsley.
By so deciding, the court reaffirmed its decisions in Rivera v.
People5 and Barrett v. People6 that "A judgment and sentence to
the penitentiary for any term, when the law requires a reformatory
confinement, is a void judgment and habeas corpus is a proper
remedy to afford relief."'7 This, in effect, overruled that part of
Hart v. Best s which held:
There is a distinction between a void and an erroneous
judgment, and the general rule is that where the court has
jurisdiction of the subject matter and of the person, its judgment in the case will not be void, although it may be
erroneous, and that in a collateral proceeding the validity
of the judgment cannot be called in question. 9
Having recorded its opinion in relation to Stilley's appeal, the
court proceeded, "by way of dictum," 10 to set forth its current
policy on habeas corpus procedure. First, it stated that the constitutional and statutory rules concerning habeas corpus are mandatory
and must be obeyed." For example, the trial court's erroneous
dismissal of Stilley's petition left Stilley and Tinsley in their
original position, that is, prisoner and jailer. Any action by Tins'ey,
4 385 P.2d at 681.
5 128 Colo. 549, 265 P.2d 226 (1953).
6 136 Colo. 144, 315 P.2d 192 (1957).
7 128 Colo. at 555, 265 P.2d at 229. See also Latham v. People, 136 Colo. 252, 317 P.2d 894
(1957), in which the petitioner was sentenced under the habitual criminol statute (C.R.S. '53 §
39-13-1 et seq.). In so sentencing him, the trial court relied on two prior felony convictions
(sentences to the penitentiary). At the time of both prior convictions petitioner was under 21
and should have been sentenced to the reformatory. Since both prior convictions were "erroneous
and void" under the rational of the Barrett case, the supreme court held the sentence under the
habitual criminal statute was likewise void and remanded the cause for resentencing in accordance with the petitioner's motion. The use by the court of the phrase "erroneous and void" was
unfortunate in light of decisions holding that habeas corpus will not lie to obtain a discharge
from an erroneous sentence (see, e.g., Martin v. District Court, 37 Colo. 110, 86 Pac. 82 (1906),
but here the sentences were so clearly void that no harm was done, see generally 25 Am. Jur.
Habeas Corpus § 27 (1940).
The problem of void sentences under the requirement of C.R.S. '53 § 39-10-1 was rectified
by an amendment to that statute in 1958. See C.R.S. § 39-10-1 (Perm. Supp. 1960).
8 119 Colo. 569, 205 P.2d 787 (1949).
9 Id. at 568, 205 P.2d at 793. The court expressly disavows this language in dictum in the
Stilley opinion. See 385 P.2d at 687.
10 385 P.2d at 681. The court said:
This opinion might well end here. However, in view of lack of consistency in prior
decisions of this court and on apparent lack of clear and definite pronouncements of this
court as to proper procedures to be followed in frequently recurring situations such as we
have here and because of the great public concern in such problems, we, contrary to our
usual procedures and by way of dictum, express our present views on several matters
that are or have been the subject of much confusion.
11 These provisions will be found in Colo. Const. art. II § 21; Colo. Const. crt. VI, §§ 3 and
11; C.R.S. '53 §§ 65-1-1 et. seq. (1953).
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other than the retention of Stilley in custody, e.g., releasing him
to the custody of another, would, the opinion states,'12be beyond
Tinsley's power and could result in a "heap of trouble.
Next, the court reviewed its decisions in Smith v. Best 13 and
Barrett v. People, supra. After distinguishing the two cases,14 the
supreme court abolished its former practice of allowing a petition
for a writ of habeas corpus, when dismissed, to be treated as a
petition for the entry of a proper judgment. 15 This reappraisal was
no doubt fostered by the adoption of the Rules of Criminal Procedure in 1961; the remedy alternatively allowed in the Smith case
now being covered by rule thirty-five.1 6
The court did not disavow all of the Barrett case. It specifically
subscribed to language therein which held that (1) habeas corpus
is in the nature of a civil proceeding, (2) habeas corpus is a proper
remedy for relief from a void judgment, and (3) it is procedurally
improper to file the petition in the criminal case, because (4) the
proper respondent is the person in whose custody the petitioner
is detained, not the People of Colorado (the complainant in the
criminal action).17

Up to this point the Stilley opinion is clear, well-reasoned, and
illuminating. It proceeds to dissolve temporarily in a morass of confusion, not all of the court's own making. This began with a
"revisitation" of Hart v. Best, supra. The court: (1) disagreed with
the holding in Hart that a sentence beyond the jurisdiction of the
12 385 P.2d at 681.
13 115 Colo. 494, 176 P.2d 686 (1946).
14 In Smith v. Best, supra, the petitioner sought a discharge on the ground that no minimum
sentence had been fixed as required by law. The court, holding that this was merely an erroneous
and not a void sentence, affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the petition, but said that the
petitioner might, at his election, have the petition treated as one for entry of proper judgment.
(Emphasis supplied.)
In Barrett, the petitioner appealed the discharge of his writ by the trial court. He had been
sentenced to the penitentiary following a burglary conviction, although he was only 19. The
sentencing court had acted on the basis of an alleged prior felony conviction. The supreme court
found that under the statute Barrett had not committed a felony since the definition, as interpreted,
requires a sentence to the penitentiary and Barrett, after his first conviction, had not been
sentenced but only placed on probation. On these facts the penitentiary sentence was void under
the Rivera opinion.
Instead of ordering Barrett's discharge, however, the court treated the petition for habeas
corpus as one for the entry of proper judgment, purportedly following the Smith case. This latter
opinion, of course, merely made the choice discretionary with the petitioner in situations where
his petition for habeas corpus would not lie to obtain o discharge from an erroneous sentence.
But in Barrett, the choice was forced on the prisoner in violation of his right to a discharge from
the void sentence.
15 The court said, at page 682 of 385 P.2d: "For the future guidance of courts and counsel,
we hold that it is mandatory that petitions for habeas corpus be treated as such, and that writs
be issued, denied, discharged or made permanent as the pleadings and proofs may dictate.'
16 Colo. R. Crim. P. 35. The rule provides, in pertinent part:
(a) Correction of Illegal Sentence
The court may correct an illegal sentence at any time. It may, on motion or of its own
motion, correct a sentence not conforming to the applicable statutes, either by amending
the sentence and record thereof, or, when circumstances require, by vacating the
sentence previously imposed and resentencing the defendant.
(b) Post Conviction Remedy for Prisoner in Custody
A prisoner in custody under sentence and claiming a right to be released on the
ground that such sentence was imposed in violation of the constitution or laws of Colorado
or of the United States, or that the court imposing the sentence was without jurisdiction
to do so, or that the sentence was in excess of the maximum sentence authorized by law,
or that the statute for the violation of which the sentence was imposed is unconstitutional
or was repealed before the prisoner contravened its provisions, may file a motion at any
time in the court which imposed such senence to vacate, set aside or correct it ...
If the court finds that the judgment was rendered without jurisdiction, or that the sentence
imposed was illegal, or that the statute upon which the sentence was based is unconstitutional or was repealed before the prisoner contravened its provisions, or that there was a
violation of the prisoner's constitutional rights of a sort not effectively subject to review
on writ of error either because the violation itself operated to prevent review or
because the violation through no fault of the prisoner did not appear upon the record
so as to be subject to review, the court shall vacate and set aside the judgment, and shall
discharge the prisoner or resentence him or grant a new trial as may appear appropriate. ...
17 385 P.2d at 682, 683.
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court was merely erroneous and not void,18 (2) found that Hart
and Martin v. District Court,19 on which it relied, are not at all
'
similar,20
(3) expressed approval that "It was incumbent upon the
defendant to exhaust his legal remedies before asking the indulgence of the court in the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus,"-1
and (4) found that the case had a "happy and just ending
in spite
2
of the many objectionable features outlined above. -One vital error in the Hart case, on which the court later
commented, was completely omitted at this point in the opinion.
Summarizing its opinion in Hart, the court said: "[W] e hold that
the District Court of Fremont county [where the petition was
filed], being a court of coordinate jurisdiction with the District
Court of Prowers county [where the original judgment was rendered], lacked jurisdiction by habeas corpus to alter, modify, or nullify
the judgment and sentence of the District Court of Prowers county.
S. 23 24
This is clearly contra to constitutional and statutory provisions.

The opinion sank deeper into the mire as the court sought to
interpret a series of 1949 cases, all of which were an outgrowth of
People v. Lindsay.2 5 In that decision it was held, in effect, that
specific intent must be proven as part of the case against one
charged with the crime of confidence game.2 6 A deluge of petitions
18 This had, in effect, already been done. See footnotes 8 and 9, supro, and related text.
19 37 Colo. 110, 86 Poc 82 (1906). See footnote 7, supra.
20 In light of its recent decisions, e.g., Rivera v. People, note 5, supra, the court is correct in
distinguishing Martin, in which a sentence of 12 to 14 years in the penitentiary was held erroneous
and not void, from Hart, in which the defendant was sentenced to the penitentiary instead of the
county jail.
Disregarded is the fact that when Hart v. Best was decided, Colorado subscribed to the
older view in post-conviction cases, that habeas corpus would lie only when the court lacked
jurisdiction over the person or the subject matter of the offense. The Martin case, supro, is a leading
example of this. See also Scott, Post-Conviction Remedies in Colorado Criminal Cases, 31 Rocky
Mt. L. Rev. 249 (1959); Habeas Corpus in Colorado for the Convicted Criminal, 30 Rocky Mt. L.
Rev. 145 (1958). See generally Anno. 76, A.L.R. 468 (1932); 25 Am. Jur. Habeas Corpus, § 27 (1940).
21 385 P.2d at 684. See 119 Colo. at 582, 205 P.2d at 794.
22 385 P.2d at 685. A supplemental record filed in the supreme court after the case had been
docketed there revealed that the defendant was charged with causing two deaths by motor vehicle
while under the influence of alcohol and that was the charge on which the jury found him guilty.
This latter charge is a felony, thus validating the penitentiary sentence.
23 119 Colo. at 584, 205 P.2d at 795.
24 Colo. Const. art. VI, § 11. "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all cases
both at law and in equity ..
"
C.R.S. '53 § 65-1-1. "If any person shall be committed or detained for any criminal or supposed
criminal matter, it shall be lawful for him to apply to the supreme or district courts, in term time,
or any judge thereof in vacation, for a writ of habeas corpus, . . . "
25 119 Colo. 248, 202 P.2d 251 (1949).
26 The People appealed a directed verdict of not guilty in the trial court. The supreme court
quoted People v. Snyder, 327 III. 402, 158 N.E. 677: "Where the property is obtained by unlawful
means other than by fraudulently obtaining the confidence so obtained, a conviction for the con.
fidence game cannot stand." The Colorado court continued: "It is apparent that the use of the
word 'false' or 'bogus' check in the 'confidence game' statute means something more than the
mere making and passing of the check. The manner of passing it and other circumstances connected
with the obtaining of money thereon necessarily must enter into the occasion before it may be
considered a part of a confidence game." The trial court's decision was affirmed.
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for writs of habeas corpus followed, claiming that the petitioners'
confidence game convictions were void under the supreme court's
ruling. The first of these to reach the supreme court (they are discussed in chonological order) was People ex rel. Metzger v. District
Court (first Metzger case) .27 The court held, in that case, that
with no record of the trial court before it on writ of prohibition
brought by the People, there was a presumption that the trial court
proceedings were proper and the judgment was free from infirmity.
The trial court no longer had jurisdiction, after the expiration of
the term of court at which judgment was pronounced, to review
the facts and the writ of prohibition was made permanent. In
dictum, the opinion explained that the Lindsay case did not change
the law, "but merely approved the defense set up in the case, which
defense 2 8may be available in many cases 'short' checks are involved.'"
The second case, Best v. People ex rel. Florom, 2 was decided
in the trial court before the first Metzger opinion, supra, was
handed down. On a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, the trial
court set aside the original judgment and sentence and resentenced
Florom nunc pro tunc to six months in county jail. On writ of
error brought by the People the supreme court judicially noticed
the lapse of three terms of court and reversed, relying on the first
Metzger case. In doing so, it was held that except for correction
of formal errors and relief from a "void and voidable" judgment,
the trial court no longer had jurisdiction. The opinion also cited
Hart v. Best, supra, for the proposition that the proper remedy
would have been a writ of error from the original judgment.
Case three was People ex rel. Metzger v. District Court (second
Metzger case).30 This involved a writ of prohibition sought by the
attorney general to prevent the district court from acting on a
petition for writ of habeas corpus. The supreme court found that
the allegations in the petition were sufficient to establish the petitioner's right to a hearing and prohibition was denied.
The Stilley opinion approves language in the second Metzger
case and disavows contrary holdings in Hart, the first Metzger
case and Best. This result is proper in view of the more recent decisions cited by the court, 31 but, contra to what the court said, the
reconciliation of the two Metzger cases is not an "impossible task. '32
27 119 Colo. 451, 208 P.2d 79 (1949).
28 Id. at 456, 208 P.2d at 81.
29 121 Colo. 100, 212 P.2d 1007 (1949).
30 121 Colo. 141, 215 P.2d 327 (1949).
31 McGrath v. Tinsley, 138 Colo. 18, 328 P.2d 579 (1958); Ferrell v. District Court, 135 Colo. 329,
311 P.2d 410 (1957); Freeman v. Tinsley, 135 Colo. 62, 308 P.2d 220 (1957), cert. den., 355 U.S. 843
(1958); Rivera v. People, 128 Colo. 549, 255 P.2d 226 (1953).
32 In the first Metzger case a petition to vacate sentence was filed in the trial court based on
the Lindsay opinion. The trial court ordered the petitioner brought to Denver pending further order
of court, whereupon the attorney general brought a prohibition action in the supreme court. In
making the write of prohibition permanent, the supreme court pointed out that there was nothing
void about the sentence of the defendant following his confidence game conviction and if there had
been error in his conviction, writ of error was the proper remedy.
On the other hand, in the second Metzger case the proceedings took a different form. The
petitioner first filed a petition and motion for vacating sentence in the nature of a writ of Carom
Nobis. On hearing, the trial court determined that under the Lindsay ruling the evidence did not
support a confidence game conviction and ordered the petitioner's former plea of guilty set aside,
vacated sentence and ordered the petitioner discharged. Subsequently the district attorney filed a
nolle prosequi. While the discharge order was in effect, the petitioner was rearrested and returned
to the penitentiary. It was from this latter confinement that he sought a writ of habeus corpus.
The attorney general's prohibition action was begun to prevent the district court from holding a
hearing on the habeas corpus application. Clearly, this would be a proper habeas corpus case, and
the court so determined by refusing the prohibition. Just as clearly these facts distinguish the two
Metzger cases.

DENVER LAW CENTER JOURNAL

VOL.

XLI

Nor is Best inconsistent with the second Metzger caseY Thus the
only true inconsistency is that between Hart v. Best and the second
Metzger case, which the court correctly pinpoints and rectifies.
The opinion emerged at this point from its needless confusion
and proceeded to clarify the position of the district and county
courts in habeas corpus proceedings. The statutory provision con"
34
ferring jurisdiction on the district courts was cited with approval
and the court said:
We disavow the obiter dictum in Rivera [sic; the court
meant Gallegos v. Tinsley, 139 Colo. 157, 337 P.2d 386
(1959) ] and hold that one seeking habeas corpus may
select his forum. He may seek the aid of the supreme court
or any district court at any time. He may even seek the aid
of any county court at the times allowed and as provided
by CRS '53, 65-1-20.35
Following this reasoning the court indicated that the statutory
regulations set up by the legislature must be carefully followed
and said:
To impose any other or additional condition on one seeking the writ would be doing exactly what the Constitution and the Legislature have said shall not be done. To
impose conditions on issuance of the writ, such as exhausting other available remedies in situations such as we have
here, is pro tanto a suspension of the writ. We accept CRS
'53, Chapter 65, at its face value and so construe it as to
make applications for the writ available in the forum most
convenient for the applicant, and recognize no restrictions
attempted to be imposed upon the right of one to choose
any forum provided by statute for asserting his rights and
the protection afforded by the Constitution and statutes.
We are not unmindful of Rule 35 of Colorado Rules of
Criminal Procedure, adopted and effective November 1,
1961 (after the judgment was entered in this case), and
observe that that rule in no way seeks to impose any conditions on the issuance of habeas corpus writs - it only
affords a remedy for those seeking a proper sentence, a
remedy which the prisoner may seek or not seek at his
election.' 0
Just what are "situations such as we have here" is not clarified
by the court. This raises the question whether or not the opinion
stands for the general proposition that one seeking habeas corpus
need no longer exhaust his legal remedies.3 7 If not, the opinion at
least holds that a motion under Rule 35 of Colo. R. Crim. P. is
not a condition precedent to petitioning for a writ of habeas corpus.
33 The facts in Best are quite similar to those in the first Metzger case. The trial court vacated
the original sentence and pronounced a new one. The People appealed and the court decided the
case as outlined in the text. It is distinguishable from the second Metzger case on this basis.
It is not intended by the text and footnote material to merely pick at the opinion of the Supreme
Court of Colorado. The purpose in pointing out the harmless misconceptions in the Stilley opinion is
to prevent the same thing from happening in a more vital context.
34 See note 24, supra.
35 385 P.2d at 688.
:6 Id. at 688, 689.
37 This would be against the weight of prior Colorado decisions. There is a clear statement in
Hart v. Best, quoted in the text, supra, at footnote 21, to the effect that legal remedies must be
exhausted before habeas corpus will lie. See also Lewis v. Tinsley, 138 Colo. 117, 330 P.2d 532 (1958);
Ex Porte Arakawa, 78 Colo. 193, 240 Pac. 940 (1925); Ex Porte Rainbolt, 64 Colo. 581, 172 Pac. 1068
(1918). But see Ex Porte Miller, 66 Colo. 261, 180 Pac. 749 (1919).
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Professor Austin Scott, Jr., in commenting on the overlapping of
Rule 35 and habeas corpus, has taken the opposite view. 3 8 Professor
Scott's view seems to be the sounder, its theory being to give the
trial court a chance to correct its own errors before beginning a
collateral attack through habeas corpus.
An outline of habeas corpus procedure in Colorado has been
badly needed for some time. Despite the inherent defects of providing this outline in a dictum opinion, 9 it is a giant step forward in this area of the criminal practice in Colorado. It is suggested that the supreme court's next step be to provide for the
codification of a set of rules governing habeas corpus. This will
provide the lasting consistency, subject to periodic revision, required in habeas corpus proceedings.
38 34 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 63, 66, 67 (1961). See footnotes 4-6 and related text. See generally 25
Am. Jur. Habeas Corpus § 19 (1940).
39) The most important defect is that the doctrine of stare decisis does not operate on dictum
opinions.
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ONE YEAR REVIEW OF
WILLS, ESTATES AND TRUSTS
By

PAUL

S.

GOLDMAN*

It was not the statement of a new rule of law that was startling
in Wright v. Poudre Valley Nat'l Bank,' but rather the court's failure to state a rule. The testator, providing for distribution of his
estate if all his brothers and sisters were dead at the death of his
daughter, directed that his estate
be divided between the surviving children of any deceased
brothers and sisters and the children of any thereof who are
deceased, share and share alike, the grandchildren of a deceased brother or sister collectively to receive the amount
their immediate ancestor would have received had such
immediate ancestor survived my said daughter [a life beneficiary].
At the date of the life beneficiary's death, there were two living
nieces of the testator and numerous living children and grandchildren of thirteen deceased nieces and nephews.
In reversing the lower court, the supreme court determined
that there should have been a per capita division of the estate into
fifteen equal shares, with one share for each of the surviving nieces,
and one share for each deceased niece or nephew who left children
surviving, the latter shares then going per stirpes to the children
of the deceased nieces and nephews. While this writer concurs in
the result, it is felt that the court failed to state a rule requisite to
reaching that result.
The supreme court cited the rule that words such as "share and
share alike" usually require a per capita distribution, 2 but went no
further. Using that rule by itself, as the court did, the children of
the deceased nieces and nephews might have successfully argued
that they too were entitled to per capita distribution. While taking
cognizance of the testator's subsequent provision that the children
of deceased nieces and nephews were to take per stirpes, the court
failed to explain how it got around the fact that the words "share
and share alike" immediately followed the devise to the children of
the deceased nephews and nieces as well as the devise to those surviving.
In reversing the lower court, the supreme court also determined
that no distribution should be made to any descendants more remote than the grandchildren of the testator's brothers and sisters,
citing the well-established rule that the word "children" will be interpreted as meaning "immediate or first degree offspring," in the3
absence of other intent being indicated by the testator's language.
Although the facts of the case are more closely connected with4
problems in the field of domestic relations, Ward v. Terriere
Senior Student, University of Denver College of Law.
1 385 P.2d 412 (Colo. 1963).
2 In re Carroll's Estate, 62 Cal. App. 2d 798, 145 P.2d 644 (1944); Chisholm v. Bradley, 99 N.H.
12, 104 A.2d 514 (1954); In re Bray's Will, 260 Wis. 9, 49 N.W.2d 716 (1951).
3 Thompson, Wills § 273 (3rd ed. 1947).
4 386 P.2d 352 (Colo. 1963).
*
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serves as an example of the complexities with which those in the
probate and trust field often find themselves involved. The plaintiff
claimed rights as a widow on the theory that the divorce between
herself and the decedent was invalid, and that even if the divorce
had been valid, she and the decedent again became husband and
wife by operation of a common law remarriage.
The plaintiff's claim that the divorce was invalid rested on the
ground that she had caused the word "dismissed" to be entered in
the order book of the county court, nearly four years after the
interlocutory decree had been entered. The supreme court determined that since the divorce decree had become final six months
after entered,5 the word "dismissed" later entered in an order book
in the clerk's office had no effect.
The question of the alleged common law remarriage was resolved against the plaintiff on conflicting testimony in the trial
court. The supreme court held that although there is a Colorado
case holding that a common law remarriage may be proved by less
than the positive and convincing proof necessary to establish a
common law marriage,6 that decision "was
not intended to strip the
'7
trial court of its fact-finding function.
In State v. Estate of Fisch,s a Colorado testator made a bequest
to a non-profit Texas corporation. The Texas corporation was denied
inheritance tax exemption by a Colorado court on the ground that
Texas does not grant reciprocal exemptions to Colorado charities.9
The American Lutheran Church, a Minnesota non-profit organization, then brought this action to recover the taxes paid by the Texas
corporation under protest, claiming that the Texas charity was a
subsidiary. The trial court ordered the taxes refunded, reasoning
that the Texas corporation, being a subsidiary of the Minnesota
corporation, could not receive the bequest and therefore could not
be taxed.
The supreme court considered the decisive question, whether
the Texas charity could take the gift directly without first having
to funnel it through its Minnesota parent organization, and followed
an earlier ruling that the law of the legatee's domicile determines
5 Colo. Sess. Laws 1929, ch. 91, § 3.
6 In re Peterson's Estate, 148 Cola. 52, 365 P.2d 254 (1961). See also 39 Dicta 102 (1962).
7 French v. Terriere, 386 P.2d 352 (Colo. 1963).
8 387 P.2d 282 (Colo. 1963).
9 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 138-4-.15 (1953).
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the legatee's capacity to take. 10 Texas law gives non-profit charitable organizations the right to acquire and hold property; the
supreme court ruled that the Texas charity took the gift directly,
and because Texas does not reciprocate with Colorado in granting
exemptions to charities, the tax was properly assessed.
An interesting collateral question arose from the fact that no
court reporter was present in the trial court. The plaintiff contended
that in the absence of a transcript, the supreme court was bound to
presume that the findings and conclusions of the trial court were
correct and that the adduced evidence supported the judgment."
The supreme court determined that stipulations equivalent to testimony, coupled with legal documents in evidence, constituted a
sufficient record.
Articles for the "One Year Review of Colorado Law" are usually confined to noting significant cases considered by the Supreme
Court of Colorado. This year, however, a ruling by the Denver
County Court is of sufficient interest to be included. In Altshuler v.
Grandy,'12 professional heir-hunters sought a declaration of their
right to examine and make copies of probate records and any papers
filed despite a statutory restriction of such access to "parties in
interest, or their attorneys.""3 Held: this restriction applies in probate proceedings despite another statutory provision which states
that such access shall be without charge. 14 The county court ruled
that this latter provision means only that "where the right of inspection exists, the right of inspection exists without charge."",
10 Galiger v. Armstrong, 114 Colo. 397, 165 P.2d 1019 (1946).
11 Burton v. Garner, 374 P.2d 707 (Colo. 1962); Teets v. Richardson,
(1955); Meagher v. Neal, 130 Colo. 7, 272 P.2d 992 (1954).
12 102 Trusts & Estates 732 (1963).
13 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 35-1-1 (1953).
14 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 37-5-12 (1953).
15 Supra note 12.

131 Colo. 592, 284 P.2d 233
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BAR BRIEFS
OPINION NO. 29
OF THE ETHICS COMMITTEE OF THE COLORADO

BAR ASSOCIATION ADOPTED JANUARY 18, 1964
SYLLABUS

A lawyer who represents a financial institution may not permit
his client systematically to refer its customers to him for legal services the customers may require personally in connection with loans
in which the financial institution is involved. Furthermore,
the lawyer may not represent, in addition to the financial institution, the seller, buyer, or borrower, unless he has the express consent of such parties given after a full disclosure of the facts.
FACTS

A lawyer represents a financial institution engaged in making
residential loans. Home owners and purchasers who apply for loans
are directed by the financial institution to its lawyer, who then prepares the contract of sale between the parties. Later, for the closing,
this lawyer prepares the deed, the note and deed of trust, and any
second mortgage papers. He also examines the abstract and performs necessary title remedial work. The seller is charged by the
lawyer for the deed, the remedial work, and one-half of the fee for
the contract and the closing. The buyer is charged for the abstract
examination, the note and deed of trust to the lending institution,
any second mortgage papers, and one-half of the fee for the contract
and closing.
Is the lawyer in violation of the Canons of Professional Ethics?
OPINION

In the opinion of the Committee, the lawyer may be in violation
of Canon 27 (solicitation of professional employment), Canon 35
(intervention of lay intermediary), and Canon 6 (representation of
conflicting interests).
The lawyer is in violation of Canon 27 if the financial institution, with his knowledge and consent, systematically refers its cugtomers to him for such legal services as the customers may require
personally in connection with loans in which the financial institution is involved. The lender is utilizing the services of its own
lawyer in the preparation of the loan statement and the note and
deed of trust to which it is a party. The other documents, while
necessary to the loan, are instruments to which the lender is not a
party and which should be drawn by the parties' own attorneys.
The lender's lawyer, in systematically accepting this employment
and charging the parties therefore, is guilty of the solicitation of

122

VOL. XLI

DENVER LAW CENTER JOURNAL

professional employment, through touters in violation of Canon 27.
The lawyer should request his client not to refer customers to him
unless they have no attorney of their own and unless they ask the
lender to recommend counsel. Even in these circumstances, the customers should be apprised by the lender of the other local counsel
available for such services, in addition to the lender's lawyer.
If the lawyer permits the systematic referral to him of the
lender's customers, he is also in violation of Canon 35, because of
the intervention of the lay intermediary between himself and the
parties to the transaction. It is obvious that if the parties do not
freely select the lawyer, but instead are routinely referred to him,
he has allowed his lay client to intervene between himself and the
parties whose rights and liabilities are affected by the performance
of his services. The lawyer's relation to these parties becomes impersonal and his responsibility, rather than being direct to them, is
to the lender to whom he owes his primary allegiance.
Finally, the lawyer violates Canon 6 unless he obtains the express consent of all parties whom he represents after a full disclosure of the facts. The interests of the lender may conflict with
the interests of the buyer and seller and the interests of the buyer
and seller may conflict with each other. If the lender's lawyer also
represents either the buyer or seller or both, he must have their
consent to do so. The lawyer is "representing" these parties if he
prepares documents affecting their rights and liabilities for a fee
as in the instant case.
The above conclusions apply whether the loan involved is a
residential loan or other type of real estate loan.
The Committee has relied in part upon its prior Opinion No. 12,
adopted March 12, 1960, Opinion No. 17, adopted January 20, 1961,
and Opinion No. 24, adopted July 20, 1962.
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ETHICAL PROBLEMS OF LAWYERS AND JUDGES
IN ELECTION CAMPAIGNS
By

KEITH ANDERSON*

Lawyers are forbidden to pay "marked attention" to a judge or
to attempt to gain from him any "special consideration or favor."'
Conversely the judge cannot accept gifts or favors from lawyers
practicing before him.2 His conduct should be free not only from
impropriety but from its appearance,' and from the "impression"
that any person can influence him. 4 He must ignore partisan demands, avoid incurring obligations which might "appear" to interfere with proper administration of his court '! and have no relationships which might "tend to arouse the suspicion" that he may
not be completely impartial. 7 Not least, he must select trustees, receivers, masters, referees, guardians, and other appointees "with a
view solely to their character and fitness," and the power to make
such appointments should not be exercised by him for "personal or
partisan advantage."
In short, relationships between lawyers and judges should be
marked by considerable reserve; there is a gulf between them
broader than that which separates other men. They must avoid not
merely the fact of impropriety, but its appearance.
This ethereal code does not exactly fit the maculate world of
party politics. The judicial candidate cannot hope to be elected unless someone contributes work and money to his campaign. Since
only lawyers are ordinarily willing to do this, judicial election campaigns always create the appearance of an unhealthy obligation running from the judge to lawyers. There is a basic conflict between professional ethical ideas and the practical necessities of
democratic elections, and the profession has had no real success in
resolving this dilemma.
The canons themselves offer a little help. Apparently the bar
has a special obligation, beyond that of other citizens, to aid in the
selection of a strong bench.9 During a campaign the judge must
"refrain from all conduct which might tend to arouse reasonable
suspicion that he is using the power or prestige of his judicial position to promote his candidacy ...he should not permit others to
do anything in behalf of his candidacy which would reasonably lead
to such suspicion."10 And this applies equally to the candidate who
is not yet a judge. 1 ' While the judge may further his campaign
* Member of the Denver Bar, and a member of the Colorado Bar Ass'n Ethics Committee.
1 Professional Canon 3. The professional canons are cited herein as "P.C."
2 Judicial Canon 32. Cited herein as "J.C."
3 J.C. 4.
4J.C. 13.
5J.C. 14.
6 J.C. 24.
7 J.C. 26.
SJ.C. 12.
9 P.C. 2; A.B.A. Op. 189 (1938).
10 J.C. 30.
11 A.B.A. Op. 226 (1941). "While this Canon [J.C. 30] refers to a judge who is a candidate,
its admonition should be respected by a lawyer who seeks to be judge. The prestige of the lawyer
candidate is largely potential, dependent upon his success. But if the chances of success are substantial, then the prestige of the candidate is capable of the same abuse as that of the judge. Each
should observe the same restraint, and for the same reasons." (Bracketed material supplied.)
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through speeches in his own behalf, he may not accept office in his
political party, be a delegate to its conventions, endorse other candidates or-otherwise be active in partisan politics. 12 But the canons
are silent on the basic question: how does the judge remain free
from the slightest breath of suspicion, even though he owes his
position largely to gifts of money and work from lawyers? Rulings
of ethics committees are beginning to cast some feeble light in this
thicket.
CAMPAIGN GIFTS:

JUDICAL CANON

32.

Judicial Canon 32, which prohibits a judge from receiving a
gift, has been relaxed in order to adjust to the practical realities
of elections. The judge cannot himself accept gifts of money, and
the canons make no exception for campaign contributions. Therefore gifts must be made to a committee, never to the judge himself. 13 It is implicit that the committee cannot be a conduit for
passing money to the judge. If he cannot receive it directly, neither
can he take it indirectly. All the funds must be spent by the committee. And, since he cannot personally receive the gift, he cannot
solicit it. 14 Indeed, there are some gifts which the candidate may
not permit his committee to accept. The gift may be taken only
if the cost of the campaign " . . . when reasonably conducted, exceeds that which the candidate would be expected to bear personally . ..the amount contributed must, of course, be only that
which the circumstances warrant."' 5 This appears to be a delicate
way of saying that the judge's partisans should not collect more
than the campaign actually costs. Most plainly, he may not permit
his committee to accept any contribution whose amount or source
indicate that it is designed to influence him.
The same principles apply to lawyers who make such gifts.' 6
(A) The lawyer must not himself be a candidate for receiver,
trustee, guardian ad litem or any other appointment, (B) the gift
must not be part of his litigation strategy, and (C) the size of the
gifts must not be sufficient to provide a surplus for distribution to
the judge after the campaign is over. Since a lawyer may contribute, it follows that he may also solicit contributions.' 7
COERCIVE TACTICS:

JUDICIAL CANON

30.

This canon prohibits the judge, the lawyer-candidate and their
partisans from using the power and prestige of judicial office to
further the candidacy. A judge may not solicit endorsement of
his candidacy by members of the bar. A judge who sent out letters
asking the addressees to have their friends mail postcards urging
12 J.C. 28.
13 Colo. Bar Ass'n Op. 33 (1964). The statement in A.B.A. Op. 226 (1941), "...
it would
also be preferable that such contribution be made to a campaign committee rather than to the
candidate personally," is too permissive. "A judge should not accept any presents or favors . . .
from lawyers practising before him.
J.C. 32 (Emphasis added.)
14 N.Y. County Op. 304 (1933).
15 A.B.A. Op. 226 (1941).
16 N.Y. County Op. 304 (1933). "A lawyer may not with propriety make a contribution ...
under circumstances which might justify the inference that the contribution is a 'device or attempt
to gain from a judge special consideration or favor'."
17 A.B.A. Informal Op. 626 (1963).
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his reappointment by the governor violated this canon and also
Judicial Canon 34, " . . . his conduct shall be above reproach."'"
Lawyers, however, may circulate petitions endorsing judicial candidates, and other lawyers may sign them. 9 . While this ruling
apparently permits the normal postcard campaign, the practice
of sending postcards to a lawyer and asking him to address them
and then return them to the campaign manager for mailing
(so that the degree of his compliance may be determined) is a
virulent breach of Judicial Canon 30.20 Obviously, the lawyer is
coerced. The candidate cannot avoid responsibility, since he
" .. .should not permit others to do anything in behalf of his
candidacy which would reasonably lead to" the suspicion that he
is using the power and prestige of the office to promote his election. 2 1 Even so, the lawyer should have the "courage and
moral
22
stamina" to resist such pressures when they are applied.
Under Canon 30 the judicial candidate may not answer legal
questions submitted to him in a radio program, 23 nor may he unfairly state his own qualifications, unjustly attack incumbents, or
indicate his probable decisions from the bench. For example, he
may not promise that he will refuse to issue injunctions2 4 against
labor unions or decrees in foreclosure and eviction cases.
PARTISAN ACITIES:

JUDICIAL CANON

28.

Under this canon the judge's activities as a member of his
political party are severely curtailed.2 5 "He should avoid making
political speeches, making or soliciting payment of assessments or
contributions to party funds, the public endorsement of candidates
for political office and participation in party conventions. He
should neither accept nor retain a place on any party committee,
nor act as party leader, nor engage generally in partisan activities."
But during his own campaign he can speak at political gatherings
and contribute to his own party. Judges may not, however, contribute to campaign funds which are to be used in an election in
which the judges are not themselves running. The canon only
permits the judge to contribute to "the party that has nominated
him and seeks his election or re-election." This
could never be the
2
case except in a year when he is on the ballot. 6
PATRONAGE:

JUDICIAL CANON

12.

In states where judges are chosen in contested elections,
it is difficult to believe that receivers, masters, guardians and the
like are always "selected with a view solely to their character and
18A.B.A. Op. 139 (1935). "Persons to whom the foregoing letter was mailed, who had or
contemplated that they might have a matter pending before the judge, would in many cases feel
under some pressure to comply with his request . .. " " Ordinarily a judge should stand on his
official record and leave the promotion of his candidacy to others." See also A.B.A. Op. 105 (1934).
19 A.B.A. Op. 189 (1938).
20 Colo. Bar Ass'n Op. 33 (1964).
21 J.C. 30.
22 A.B.A. Op. 189 (1938).
23 A.B.A. Op. 93 (1933).
24 Michigan Op. 74 (1941).
25A.B.A. Op. 193 (1939); see also generally A.B.A. Op. 113 (1934), which also restricts somewhat the activities of his bailiff and, perhaps too optimistically, his wife.
26 A.B.A. Op. 289 (1955).
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fitness." On the contrary, partisan activity seems to be a primary
qualification. A rule that judges may not distribute patronage
to their campaign committees would be a healthy development,
but there is no such rule now, and until there is, almost superhuman strength of character would be required for a judge to
overlook his campaign manager in distributing patronage, even
though the manager may not be the best-qualified lawyer avail27
able.
ADVERTISING:

PROFESSIONAL

CANON

27.

"It is unprofessional to solicit professional emp'oyment
by . . .personal communications or interviews not warranted by personal relations. Indirect advertisements for
professional employment such as furnishing or inspiring
newspaper comments, . . . and all other like self-laudation, offend the traditions and lower the tone of our profession and are reprehensible . . . ,,28
Since judges are lawyers, they are bound by this canon. An
exception has been created for elections, but its scope is strictly
limited to the necessities.2 9 Therefore a candidate for district
attorney may send out letters soliciting votes, and he may distribute campaign literature with his picture and a statement that he
is a lawyer. 30 He can make newspaper releases, but only if they
are for the sole purpose of furthering his candidacy. Similarly, he
may state in advertisements that he is a lawyer, but only if the
advertisements are during the campaign.," And he may be identified in television programs as a lawyer, when he is a candidate
32
for Congress.
But even this canon is not completely repealed. If a lawyer
files for an office to which he has no hope or intention of being
elected, and uses his candidacy as an excuse for a barrage of mailings, campaign cards and statements to the press which are really
designed to acquaint potential clients with the lawyer's name, he
violates the canon. 33 Unfortunately the candidate's motives are
usually known only to himself so that few violations of this sort
are ever punished. Nevertheless a liberal policy is essential, even
though it permits the sham candidate to advertise himself as a
27 N.Y. County Op. 422 (1953) discusses (rather uncomfortably) a similar question: appointment of the judge's former partner. " ...
an occasional appointment by a judge of a former
partner, with whom the judge has no financial relationship and presuming that the former partner
is otherwise qualified, would not in our opinion be an improper act." But since the act may well
be misunderstod, ' . . . unusual care should be token to avoid the charge of favoritism. Con.
sideration should be given both to the frequency of such appointments, as well Cs to the size of
the matters." These principles apply even more strongly to those who play a prominent part in
the judge's election.
28 P.C. 27.
29 Michigan Op. 74 (1941).
30 A.B.A. Informal Dec. No. 656 (1963).
31 A.B.A. Informal Dec. No. 529 (1962).
32 A.B.A. Informal Dec. No. C-230(b)(1961).
33 A.B.A. Informal Op. No. 546 (1962). "On the other hand, releases relating to the lawyer's
civic and social activities, as a lawyer, might well be included within the forbidden area of
indirect advertising for professional employment; obviously, he should avoid the suspicion of any
such motive."
Drinker, Legal Ethics 248 (1953). "The candidate for a public office who is a lawyer may
advise the public of this when the office sought is one in which his legal train;ng adds to his
qualifications to fill the office (Wash. 9; Mich. 52; Mo. 36) but may not use h's candidacy as an
excuse for advertising that he is a lawyer. (App. A 65; Mich. 89; Cleveland 10; . . .)"
(Emphasis
supplied.)

1964

PROBLEMS OF LAWYERS AND JUDGES

lawyer while the genuine candidate is advertising for votes. The
candidate should not, however, use his professional letterhead for
campaign advertising. Thus a lawyer who was also mayor of his
city could not mail political messages to 15,000 voters upon his
professional
letterhead. Plainly this is a solicitation of legal bus34
iness.
The judge's campaign managers must be careful not to advertise themselves in the press. While few of the rulings deal with
elections, the analogies are strongly suggestive. A lawyer may not
pose for pictures or submit material to a newspaper or a magazine
since this advertises him to possible future clients.; And he must
suppress laudatory newspaper comments about himself."6 Therefore he may not inspire or furnish newspaper comments concerning cases in which he is engaged,3 7 or make any other unsolicited
newspaper release."" He may not permit others to make a release
stating that he is leaving governmental service and will resume
practice, if the release also describes his experience or qualifications.'" He may not permit his name to be published in an advertisement for a charitable cause along with his address or a statement that he is a lawyer. The advertisement is ethical if he is
not identified as a lawyer, however. 40 And obviously the use of
his firm's name in a charitable advertisement " . . . smacks some-

what of self-laudation or commercialism, even though not so intended."'4 1 He cannot write "letters to the editor" in which he is
identified as a lawyer, and in a small community where many
readers would know he is a lawyer, he may not write such letters
at all where "The subject matter was of a controversial nature
42
and one that could easily require the services of an attorney.
From all this one infers that lawyers who are members of the
judge's campaign committee should not publish their own names
in newspapers. Although there does not seem to be any decision
precisely in point the charitable advertisement cases are indistinguishable. This rule should apply both to press releases and
to advertisements endorsing the candidate. It clearly prohibits the
kind of advertisement in which the endorsing lawyers are listed
by name.4 3 Often these imply in a more or less subtle way that
the endorsers are men of substance in the profession. The mere
statement, "we have observed Judge X in court daily" certainly
leads one to believe that the endorsers are unusually experienced
litigators, since few lawyers are in court "daily." But even a tombstone advertisement which merely lists the endorsing lawyers by
name may carry the inference that they are respected (and in
effect endorsed) by the judge, who would perhaps not otherwise
Cp. Michigan Op. 89 (1945) with A.B.A. Op. 93 (1933).
A.B.A. Op. 42 (1931).
A.B.A. Op. 62 (1932).
A.B.A. Op. 140 (1935).
A.B.A. Informal Dec. No. C-479 (1962).
A.B.A. Op. 184 (1938).
A.B.A. Informal Op. 547 (1962).
A.B.A. Informal Op. 653 (1963).
A.B.A. Informal Dec. No. C-473 (1962).
43 Colo. Bar Ass'n Op. 32 (1964); the A.B.A.'s committee has, however, reached an opposite
result, authorizing at least one advertisement of this type. A.B.A. Informal Dec. C-748 (1964).
34
35
3
37
38
39
40
41
42
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permit the advertisement. In any case, the necessity principle
does not apply. The qualifications and biography of Judge X can
(and should) be presented to the voters in an advertisement paid
for by the "Committee of 100 lawyers for the election of Judge X,"
who are not identified by name.
The solicitation of votes by a letter-writing or postcard campaign, and solicitation of funds on the lawyer's letterhead, are
apparently authorized only if addressed to brother lawyers, personal friends and clients who already know the sender to be a
lawyer, because this is "warranted by personal relations. 4 4 Mailings on a professional letterhead to any large group, whatever the
purpose, necessarily advertise the sender and are forbidden. Similarly, solicitation on the "Committee of Lawyers" type of letterhead appears to violate the canon, because few of the recipients
would have the necessary personal
relationship with all the law4
yers listed on the letterhead. 5
CONCLUSIONS

Underlying all these opinions is the general idea that the
canons will be relaxed to the extent necessary to permit conduct
of a vigorous campaign, but no further. Practices not absolutely
necessary for that purpose are condemned. It is unfortunately
plain, however, that even the most ethically conducted campaign
involves a series of exceptions to the canons which warp their
spirit and which add nothing to the public respect for our judicial
system.
The lawyer-candidate must advertise himself on a massive
scale. Judges inevitably incur obligations to those who manage
campaigns and donate money which certainly "tend to arouse the
suspicion" that the judge may not have an "impartial attitude of
mind in the administering of his judicial duties." Doubtless there
is occasionally some substance in these shadows, at least in the
distribution of patronage. As long as judges, through their committees, must accept gifts of money and work from lawyers there
will be gnawing doubts as to their freedom from influence and
bias. Nevertheless, if a stricter attitude should be taken toward
campaign activities of lawyers, the selection of judges will be left
entirely in the hands of party organizations and newspapers, both
relatively uninformed lay groups. A serious deterioration in the
quality of the bench might well result. Wherever judges are
chosen in contested elections some bending of professional standards is vitally necessary.
The ultimate solution must lie in adoption of another method
of selecting judges. The federal system appears to produce judges
at least as good as those selected in state elections, and it does so
without compromising their dignity or independence. There are of
course a number of other plans. Until one of them is adopted,
however, the candidate and his manager must maintain an exceedingly delicate and uneasy balance between principle and necessity.
44 A.B.A. Informal Dec. No. 626 (1963).
45 Colo. Bar Ass'n Op. 32, supro (1964).

